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ACCORD AND SATISFACTION.
1. C. purchased the defendant's millinery goods, and in part consideration
thereof, agreed to pay the defendant's debt to the plaintiff. C. thereupon
wrote the plaintiff that her husband proposed to give his note on six months
for said debt, and the plaintiff replied, accepting the proposition. Tie note
was never given, but C. made Temittances to the plaintiff from time to time,
to apply on said debt. Hed, a mere accord, and that the defendant was not
thereby discharged from the balance of the debt. Rising v. Ciummings, 55.
2. Waiver of a promise to pay the debt of another that is without consid-
eration and within the Statute of Frauds, or refusal to receive such payment,
does not discharge the original debtor. Id.
ACCOUNT. See FRAUD, 1 ; PARTNERSHIP, 9. -
ACKNOWLEDGMENT. See DEED, 8.
ACTION. See AGENT, 6.
1. The real defendant who pays a judgment against a nominal party,
afterwards vacated, may recover in his own name the money so paid. Mann
v. .tna Ins. Co., 246.
2. For malpractice by a physician, successive suits for accruing damages
cannot be brought, but the recovery is once for all, and may embrace pro-
spective as well as accrued damages. Howell v. Goodrich, 308.
3. An action of asstimpsit against parties jointly, fails if there is no evidence
of a joint liability on their part. Mace v. Page, 183.
4. Joinder of parties is not necessary where there is no unity of estate.
Columbia Bridge Co. v. Geisse, 115."5. In an action to recover a debt which the defendant agreed with a third
party to pay the plaintiff, the defendant can show the rescission of the agree-
ment prior to the plaintiffs assent to the promise made in his favor. Trimble
v. Strother;183.
6. In such case, the defendant is not estopped from setting up any defence
which he could have set up against the enforcement of the contract by the
other contracting party. Id.
ACTS OF CONGRESS.
1789, See CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, 37.1846, July 9. See GOVERNMET, 3.
1861, July 13. See WAR, 4.
1863, March 12. See CAPTURED AND ABANDONED PROPERTY.
1867, March 2. See BANKRUPTCY.
1867, May 2. See REMOVAL OF CAUSES.
1868, February 10. See NATIONAL BANwt.
1868, July 20. See DISTILLFD SPIRITS.
1870, May 31. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 5.
1874, Revised Statutes.
Sect. 709. See COURTS, 3.
Sect. 3324. See DISTILLED SPIRITS.
Sect. 5399. See WITNESS, 3.
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ACTS OF CONGRESS.
1874, June 23. See SIIPPING, 5.
1875, March 3. See REMOVAL OF CAUSES.
ADMINISTRATOR. See EQUITY, 13; EXECUTOR; PAYMENT, 1.
ADMIRALTY. See ARnITRATION, 1.
I. Collision.
1. In cases of collision, where there is a great conflict of testimony, the
court must be governed chiefly by leading facts, if such exist in the case.
The Great Republic, 373.
2. A largo and fast-sailing steamer is bound to act cautiously when over-
taking a small and slow one. .d.
3. The burden is on the vessel neglecting the proper measures of precau-
tion to show that the collision if one occurs did not occur through her neglect.
Id.
4. The rule of navigation which requires '1 when sailing ships are meet-
ing end on, or nearly so, the helms of both shall be put to port;" is obliga-
tory from the time that necessity for precaution begins, and continues to be
applicable so long as the means and opportunity to avoid the danger remain.
The Dexter, 495.
5. The absence of a lookout is unimportant where his presence would have
done nothing to avert the catastrophe. Id.
6. A collision having occurred on a clear night between a steamship and
sailing vessel, there having been some want of vigilance in the lookout of
the steamer, 'the steamship was held to be exclusively responsible. The Sea
Gull, 495.
7. Two steamers were held to be equally in fault for running at full speed
in a very dark and foggy night, after they had learned by signals from each
other of their respective existences in the river, and while they were in doubt
as to what respectively were their courses and manoeuvres. The Teutonia,
495.
8. Because a cross-libel in an admiralty suit is dismissed the libellant in
the cross-libel is not precluded from showing in the original suit, that a colli-
sion was the result of inevitable accident, was occasioned by the negligence
of those in charge of the other vessel, or was a case of 'mutual fault. Pitts,
Ex'r, 4-c., v. River 4- Lake Shore Steamboat Line, 548.
9. Two ships under steam, if they are meeting end on, are required to put
their helms to port, and this requirement must be seasonably complied with.
Ferryboat, 4-c., v. Railroad Transportation Co., 549.
10. Sailing rules are to prevent dollisions, not to enable one party to see
how little he can do without becoming liable. Id.
11. The rule, that where both vessels are in fault the damages should be
divided between them, ought not to be extended so far as to inflict positive
loss on innocent parties. Coastwise Co. v. De las Casas; De las Casas v.
Steaiacr Alabama et al., 550.
12. Usages, called sea laws, existed long before there was any legislation
upon the subject. Steamship City of TUashington, 4-c., v. Baillie, 550.
13. The owners of a pilot vessel are not liable for the consequences of a
collision by reason of not having a mast-head light, when she constantly
showed flash-lights, which were seasonably seen by the other vesssl. Id.
II. Liability of Ship Owners.
14. The owners of a vessel in flames towed by a tug and no longer in
command of her own captain and crew, are not liable for injury done by her
to another vessel, by the negligence of the captain of the tug; the said owners
not having employed the tug, she being a tug whose regular business was the
assistance of vessels in distress, and she having gone, of her own motion, to
the extinguishment of the fire in this case. The Cla-ita and The Clara, 374.
15. The owners of a vessel who through their own carelessness set fire to
another vessel, cannot claim salvage for putting that fire out. Id.
16. Owners of ships are responsible for the conduct of the master and crew
in the navigation of the vessel. Robert v. Propeller Galatea, 678.
17. Exceptions exist where it is necessary to employ a steam-tug and to
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turn over the control and navigation of the ship to the master and crew of
the latter vessel. .Robert v. Propeller Galatea, 678.
3II Maritime Lien.
18. The captain of a vessel has no authority to pledge the credit of the
owner for necessary repairs made dt the home port. Pextz v. Clarke, 60.
19. The fact that the captain is a co-owner gives him no such authority.
To bind the owner, the'master must have special authority for that purpose;
or the owner must have held out the master as having such authority; or he
must have ratified the contract after it was made. Id.
20. A maritime lien-for supplies furnished a vessel exists in the port of a
state where her owner does not reside. Dowell v. Goode, .183.
21. The United States courts have exclusive jurisdiction to enforce such
lien by suit in rem. Id.
22. The residence of the owner determines the home port of the vessel.
Id.
AGENT. See COPORxATXOIN, 29.
1. Persons dealing with an agent, acting within the scope of his authority,
are entitled to the same protection as if dealing with the principal. Angle v.
Life Ins. Co., 739.
2. If money borrowed by an agent on the credit of the principal without
authority, goes into the principal's business without the latter's knowledge,
and the principal has the benefit thereof, yet the principal is not liable there-
for to the person of whom it was borrowed, in the absence of a promise to
pay. Spooner v. Thompson, 678.
3. An agent cannot act for both buyer and seller. Fish v. Leser, 248; and
see BitoicEn, 2, 3.
4. A tenant of a corporation, under a lease made by its agent, cannot dis-
pute the agent's authority. Brahn v. Jersey City Forge Co., 116.
5. An agent who demands possession for his principal, must have authority
to make the demand at the time of making it. Id.
6. An action may be maintained by an undisclosed principal upon the con-
tract of his agent. Bryant v. eVls, 495.
7. Notice to an agent to be notice to the principal must come in the course
of the principal's business, or from a prior transaction then present to the
agent's mind, which could be properly communicated to the principal.
Hoover v. Wise, 548.
8. But notice or knowledge on the part of an agent of an intermediate
employer will not affect the principal. Id.
9. To make the act of an agent done without the authority of his principal
binding upon the latter, it is necessary to show that he subsequently, with
full knowledge of all the material facts, ratified the act. Bannon v. lVarfidd,
308.
10. Where, an agent lends the money of his principal upon a security
which proves to be insufficient, evidence may be introduced to show that the
value of the security was very much less than the estimate placed thereon by
the agent. Id.,
11. It is mot competent to prove the supposed authority of an agent by
what he has said at some previous time. Howe Machine Co. v. Clark, 309.
12. The admissions of an agent can only be received after it has been
proved that he is an agent. First Unitarian Society v. Faulkner, 555.
13. The declarations of an agent in pais are not proof of his authority as
agent. Grim v. Bonnell, 374.
ALIMONY. See CONtLOT Or LAws, 4.
ALLUVION.
i. Means an addition to riparian land, gradually made by the water to
which the land is contiguous. County of St. Clair v. Lovingston, 375.
2. The test is that, though the witnesses may see that progress has been
made, they could not perceive it while the process was going on. Id.
3. It is equally alluvion whether the addition be to streams which do over-
flow their banks or those that do not. Id.
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AMENDMENT. See CHECK, 7; TRESPASS, 2.
In a bill to enforce an implied trust, an averment of an express promise to
perform the trust does not constitute a new cause of action. Hall v. Cong-
(Ion, 617.
APPLICATION OF PAYMENTS.
1. Payments made to a creditor holding demands both due and undue,
without direction by the debtor as to their application, must, ordinarily, be
first applied by the creditor upon the demands due. Early v. Flannery, 55.
2. Payments must he applied to notes not barred by the Statute of Limit-
ations. Moore v. Kiff et al., 382.
AQUEDUCT. See EASEMENT, 8.
ARBITRATION. See LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF, 6.
1. Parties in the Court of Admiralty, whether sitting in prize or as an
instance court, can submit their cisse by rule of court to arbitration. United
States v. .Fhrragut, 247.
2. The award however is liable, like any other award, to be set aside in
the court below, for such reasons as would be sufficient in other courts ; as
for exceeding the power conferred by the submission, for manifest mistake
of law, for frnud, and for all other reasons on which awards are set aside in
other courts of law or chancery. Id.
3. By a parol agreement to submit to the arbitration of two persons, it was
stipulated that, in case they could not agree, they should select an umpire,
and that the decision of such umpire and any of said arbitrators should be
final. The decision of the umpire was all that was required. Sanford et al.
v. IWood, 52.
ARMY. See WAR, 2, 3.
ASSAULT AND BATTERY. See CRIMIXAL LAW, III.
ASSIGNMENT. See DEBTOR AND CREDITOR, I.
ASSUMPSIT. See ACTION 3 ; CONTRACT, 1 ; LIMITATIONS, 4.
ATTORNEY. See HUSBAND AND WIFE, 21.
1. The mayor or councilman of a municipality is not bound by his official
position to give to the latter his professional services as a lawyer without
charge. Mayor v. Muzzy, 183.
2. An attorney has no claim to be reimbursed or allowed for costs and ex-
penses growing out of his wrongful act. Hug!s v. Zeigler, 309.
3. There may be different degreds of guilt as between the parties to a
fraudulent or illegal transaction. Roman v. 31ali, 437.
4. The relationship of attorney and client will not except the case from the
general rule, in peri delicto potior est conditio possidentis, ant defendentis. Id.
5. An attorney is under no actual incapacity to deal with his client. If
the transaction is fair it will be maintained. Id.
6. A complainant, who files a libel to procure the forfeiture of personal
property for violation of law, and prosecutes the same wholly at his own ex-
pense, is entitled to do so without interference from the state attwrney. State
v. Tuft , 495.
7. When such libel is prosecuted at the expense of the county, its direc-
tion will be taken charge of by the attorney-general or solicitor. 1d.
8. A prosecuting officer will use his discretion, according to the circum-
stances of each particular case, whether to enter a nolle prosequi, or prosecute
to final judgment. Id.
9. Attorneys should be residents of the state in which they are licensed to
practice. They are officers of the court and the nature of their office implies
that they shall be residents and subject to the jurisdiction of the state and the
court. In re 3osness, 670.
10. An attorney of record signed an agreement in writing that the report
of the referee should be final, and the agreement was entitied as of the term
of the court to which the report was to be made. Hdd, that his client was
bound by such agreement. Brooks v. New Durham, 116.
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BAIL.
POWER OF COURTS TO ADMIT TO, 1.
BAILMENT. See CoMmoN CARMER.
1: A bailee cannot at law deny that his bailor had title to the property at
the time of its delivery to him. itdd v. lfontanye, 183.
2. A pledge is a security for the whole debt and every part of it. Baldwin
v. Bradley, 309.
3. A bailee keeping the property of the bailor with the ordinary care with
which he keeps his own, does not fulfil his duty, if the contract required strict
diligence and extraordinary care. First National Bank v. Graham, 618.
4. Where the benefits are reciprocal, the bailee is liable for neglect of ordi-
nary care, although he has been careless and reckless in the management of
his own goods as well as those of the bailor. Id.
5. That the bailee has dealt with his own goods and the bailor's in the
sanic way, is evidence in adjusting the standard of duty and deciding the
question of performance, and as a test of the bailee's good faith. It would
raise a presumption of adequate diligence. Id.
6. The bailec's responsibility is to be determined in each case by a com-
parison with the conduct of classes of men, not of individuals. Id.
7. The mere voluntary act of the cashier in receiving securities for safe-
keeping, will not render the bank liable for their loss; but if the deposit
be known to the directors and acquiesced in, the bank will be liable. Id.
BANK AND BANKER. See BAILMENT, 7 ; CnECx, 4-6 ; CONTRACT, 1, 2;
GIFT, 3; SET-OFF, 4, 5.
A previous demand by a depositor, or some other person by his order, is
indispensable to the maintenance of an action for a general deposit of money
with a banker. JBrahm v. Adkins, 496.
BANKRUPTCY.
I. Effect of Proceedings. See LANDLORD AND TENANT, 3.
1. Where, pending a suit in a state court for the foreclisure of a mortgage,
the mortgagor is adjudicated a bankrupt, there is no provision in the Bank-
rupt Act which would prevent the court from proceeding with the case. Ejster
v. Gaff et al., 549.
2. The debtor of a bankrupt loses none of his rights by the bankruptcy of
his adversary. Id.
3. Plea in bar that since the commencement of suit, the defendants had
been adjudged bankrupts, Hdd, bad on general demurrer. Brandon Co. v.
Frazier, 52.
4. It was the object of the fourteenth section of the Bankrupt Act to pre-
vent any particular creditor asserting any lien but such as existed when the
petition in bankruptcy was filed. Morgan v. Campbell, 253.
5. Under a statute which enacts that the " owner" may within a time
named redeem land sold for taxes, a redemption may properly be made by a
person who has been decreed a bankrupt, the lands having been his. Ilamp:on
v. Rouse, 248.'
6. A mortgage cannot be discharged by a sale of a bankrupt's land by order
of court without notice to the mortgagee. Ray v. Norseworthy, 496.
'7. As to supervisory jurisdiction of Circuit Court, see Itickney v. Wi!t,
496.
II. Preferences.
8. An agreement by a judgment-debtor to revive a judgment so as to create
a lien on after-acquired land, within four months of adjudication of bank-
ruptcy, is not in fraud of the Bankrupt Law. Kemmercr v. Tool, 375.
9. The circumstance that a debtor consents to do what was for his own
advantage would not affect the creditor with knowledge of insolvency, which
from other facts he had no reasonable cause to believe. Id.
10. The bankrupt's real estate was sold by the sheriff, who paid the judg-
ment-creditor in the revived judgment. Held, that the state court had juris-
diction to entertain a suit by the assignees in bankruptcy for the recovery of
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the money so paid, if the judgment has been in fraud of the Bankrupt Law.
K cnmcrer v. 7bol, 375.
11. Construction of sections 14, 35 and 39 of the Bankrupt Act of 1867.
Rlenkehmman and Others v. Smith, Assignie, 375.
12. A new mortgage for principal and interest of a previous one overdue
is not a preference, although made within four months of bankruptcy. Burn-
hisel v. Firman, 117.
13. A judgment obtained against a debt6r within four months before pro-
ceedings in bankruptcy were commenced is not per se in fraud of the Bank-
rupt Law, although the creditor had reason to believe that the debtor was
insolvent at the time. Louchehn v. l-enszey, 116.
14. Actual collusion, or fraud in fact, is always for the jury. Id.
15. The United States is a preferred creditor as to the separate and indi-
vidual assets of bankrupt partners. Lewis v. United States, 678.
M. Discharge. See VENDOR AND PURCHASER, 12.
16. A discharge in bankruptcy cannot be impeached collaterally. Smith
v. Ramsey, 739.
IV. Assiqnee. See PARTNERSHIP, 1.
17. An assignment of a bankrupt's land by a register to an assignee in
bankruptcy, not acknowledged or proved as required by the laws of Pennsyl-
vania, cannot be recorded in that state. Zeigler v. Shomo, 438.
18. From the commencement of proceedings in bankruptcy the estate of
the bankrupt is in the custody of the District Court of the United States. Id.
19. A purchaser at an assignee's sale is not bound to see that every par-
ticular in the assignee's appointment has been complied with ; he takes what-
ever title was in the bankrupt. Id.
20. It is no defence to an action of ejectment brought against a bankrupt
for land sold as his, that the right of possession was in his wife when the
writ was served, if the wife had no title. Id.
BILL OF EXCEPTIONS. See ERRORS AND APPEALS, 3.
BILL OF LA)ING. See BILLS AND NOTES, 21.
Where sent with draft with instruction to deliver the goods only on
payment, and the consignee in violation of orders, delivers to a third party as
purchaser, the latter acquires no title and is liable to the consignor in trover.
Dnzcs v. .Mat. Ex. Bank, 681.
BILLS AND NOTES.
I. Fbrm, consideration, d-c.
I. Where a statute directs that any note "1 given for a patent right," shall
contain those words in the body thereof, and makes it a misdemeanor for any
person to take a note for such consideration without the insertion of those
words, the note itself is not illegal and void without those words, nor is it
within the rule that the infliction of a penalty upon an act makes it per se
illegal and prevents it from being the foundation of a civil action. Hence,
when the maker of a note for such consideration omits to have the
words inserted, the failure of consideration is no defence against an innocent
holder for value. Pendar v. Kelle!, 511.
2. A note promising to pay B. or bearer forty dollars " profits," with
interest, etc., is negotiable. iMatthew v. Crosby, 497.
3. A warrant of attorney to confess judgment destroys negotiability.
Sweeneyl v. Thickston, 53.
4. Where a note appears to have been altered after execution, the jury
must judge whether the alteration is such as ought to put a bon& fide pur-
chaser upon inquiry, or whether it was left by the maker in such. a condition
as to give an opportunity for fraud. Iron Mountain Bank "v. Armstrong, 733.
5. Where a party to a negotiable instrument intrusts it to another for use
as such, with blanks not filled up, such instrument carries on its face an im-
plied authority to fill up the blanks ; but this authority would not authorize
the person intrusted with the instrument to alter its material terms by 6rasing
any written or printed part of it. Angle v. Lofe Ins. Co., 739.
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6. Where a note was given for an amount due the payee from the maker
on a certain contract, this was a sufficient consideration, although the payee
may have owed the maker at the time more than the face of the note, on other.
contracts. Knox v. Clifford, 184.
II. Rights of the Parties. See BILL OF LADING.
7. Where a plaintiff sues on a note as trustee for another, the maker may
avail himself of any defence which he might set up against the real owner.
Bdohradsky v. Kuhn, 248.
8. An.Indiana bank drew on a Philadelphia bank in favor of the cashier
of a New York bank ; the draft was stolen, the name of the cashier (payee)
forged as endorser and passed to defendants, October 16th, in payment of
goods sold to the holder, they giving to him a check on the Philadelphia bank
for the difference, which was drawn, and the draft, endorsed by the defend-
ants, was deposited to their credit in the same bank. After learning of the
fraud, on November 2d, the bank demanded payment of the draft from de-
fendants. Held, that the demand was in time. Chambcrs et al. v. Union Na-
tional Bank, 375.
9. The holder of a draft which is endorsed and passed by him, guaranties
the prior endorsements. .d.
10. In an action on a promissory note, evidence is inadmissible to show a
parol agreement, made when the note was given, that it should not be nego-
tiated by the payee. Knox v. Clifford, 184.
11. One who purchases negotiable paper, before maturity, without notice,
in absolute payment of a pre-existing debt, surrendering his previous security,
is protected by the law merchant against all equities of the maker as against
the payee. Id.
12. One who makes and puts in circulation a negotiable note, bearing date
on a secular day, is estopped, as against an innocent holder, from showing
that it was executed on Sunday. Id.
13. After accepting and paying a bill, the drawee cannot recover back the
amount of it from the payee on the ground that he had paid it under a mis-
take as to the reliability of the drawer's security, which had proved to be
fictitious. National Bank v. Burkham, 184. '
14. Where the makers of a promissory note are sued jointly, the defence
of illegal interest by one of the defendants inures to the benefit of all. Hil-
let T. Longacrc, 679. '
15. One who takes a negotiable note before maturitr,.at its full value, in
payment of a pre-existing debt, in good faith, and without notice of anything
that would invalidate it in the hands of the payee, is a bonk fide holder for
value. Russell v. Splater, 53.
16. Where the payee takes up a promissory note after its negotiation by
him, the ownership, both legal and equitable, will return to him, and he may
maintain an action thereon in his own name. Palmer v. Gardiner, 497.
II. Endorsement, Acceptance, &c.
17. Adams, a partner of Moorehead & Co., drew a note in favor of Whit-
ten & Co., of whom also he was a member, and, after it was endorsed by the
payees, endorsed the name of Moorehead & Co. ; the note was sold to the
plaintiff by a known bill-broker. Hrdd, that these circumstances were not
notice to the plaintiff that the endorsement was without authority. Moore-
head v. Gilmore, 52.
18. Each partner has the same right to raise money for the use of the firm
by endorsement of negotiable paper as to do so by means of paper already
issued, and the public is not affected by the private restriction on the power
of each partner. Id.
19. Where the holder of a time-draft, with accompanying bills of lading,
sends them to an agent with no special instructions to hold the bills of lading,
the agent is authorized to surrender the bills to the drawee on the latter's ac-
ceptance of the drafts. National Bank of Commerce v. Merchants' National
Bank, 102.
20. It does not make any difference that the drafts are sent to the agent
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"' for collection." That instruction merely rebuts the inference of the agent's
ownership of the draft. National Bank of Commnerce v. Merchants' National
Bank, 102.
21. Bills of lading, though transferable by endorsement, are only quasi
negotiable ; and the endorsee does not acquire the right to change the agree-
ment between the shipper and his vendee. Id.
22. A bill of exchange may be accepted by parol. Scudder v. Union Na-
tional Bank-, 619.
23. A partnership firm becoming owners of a note made by one of the
firm cannot recover at law upon it, but may in equity. Hall v. Kimball, 498.
BOUNDARY.
Where, in a deed, the middle of a stream is called for as the boundary line
between adjacent proprietors, it will control the courses and distances named
in the conveyance. Niehanz v. Shepherd, 502.
BROKER.
1. Earns his commission when he finds a purchaser at the proper terms,
though the sale fails to be made an account of the owner's action. Lane v.
Albrkhyt, 53.
2. When a real estate broker, employed to sell a farm, disposes of it by way
of exchange for other real, estate, he is not entitled to charge the owner of the
latter a commission. The law does not permit the broker in such a case to
act as agent for both parties. Even an agreement to pay such commission
could not be enforced by an action thereon. Raisin v. Clarke, 61.
3. Nor could an action be maintained by proof of a custom or usage. Id.
And see AGE.T, 3; CONTRACT, 22.
4. Plaintiffs were bankers and paid their tax as such. They also bought
and sold gold and stocks for others, and on their own account. An addi-
tional tax upon them, as brokers, for all their sales of this kind, as well
those on their own account as those for others was proper. IV aren v. Shook,
549.
CAPTURED AND ABANDONED PROPERTY. See LANDLORD AND TEN-
ANT, I.
A factor is not an owner of property within the meaning of the Abandoned
and Captured Property Act, at least not beyond the extent of his lien. United
States v. 17llalonga, 376.
CHARITY. See TIUST, 4.
CHARTER-PARTY. See SHIPPING, 1.
CHATTEL MORTGAGE. See REPLEviz;, 1.
CHECK.
1. The bolder of a bank check is bound to present it within a reasonable
time ; otherwise the delay is at his own peril. lMoodruffv. Plant, 145.
2. But what is a reasonable time must depend upon the particular circum-
stances of the case. And the time may be extended by the assent of the
drawer, express or implied. ld.
3. The plaintiff, desiring to make a remittance to a creditor at a distance,
and there being no bank in the place where he lived, asked the defendant, who
had an account with a banker in a neighboring city, to take the amount
of him in bank bills and give him his check therefor, and the defendant, fully
understanding the object, took the bank bills and gave the plaintiff his check
upon the banker, payable to the plaintiff's order, the defendant the same day
depositing the bills with the banker. The plaintiff at once endorsed the
check to his creditor and sent it by the next mail. It was three days before
the check reached the place where the banker resided and was presented for
payment, at which time the banker had failed and payment was refused. The
plaintiff having taken up the check sued the defendant thereon. .Held, that
the check was presented within a seasonable time in the circumstancesi and
that the defendant was liable. Id.
4. It is the duty of a bank to whom a check is sent for collection to pre-
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sent it and demand payment within the time prescribed by law, and if not
paid notify the proper parties of its dishonor. Essex County Nat. Bank- v.
Bank of Montreal, 418.
5. A bank upon whom a check is drawn is liable, before acceptance, only
to the drawer ; it cannot be made liable to the holder except by its own con-
sent. Id.
6. If a bank to whom a check is sent for collection, instead of demanding
immediate payment, accepts a certification of it, that will create such a new
relation between the parties as to discharge the drawer, and will render the
bank accepting the certificati6n in lieu of payment, liable for any loss arising
to the holder from the failure of the bank upon which the check was drawn.
Id.
7. The party to whom the check is endorsed for collection is the proper
plaintiff, and an amendment, under the practice in Illinois. is allowable at the
trial, substituting such party as plaintiff. Id.
CHURCH. See PUBLIC SCHOOLS; TAXATION, 4.
1. It appeared that the land on which the Catholic church and parsonage
in Portsmouth stands, was vested in the defendant, Bacon, bishop of the dio-
cese, no trust being declared in writing : Held, that no special trust could be
proved by parol. Hennesseg et at. v. 11'alsh et al., 264.
2. It appearing that the funds with which said land was bought had been
furnished for that purpose by subscriptions and contributions made to the
priest in charge for the time being, under the law, usage and polity of the
Roman Catholic church, by Catholics and others resident in Portsmouth and
elsewhere: Held, that no trust resulted to the society or congregation wor-
shipping in said church. .d.
3. The defendants having stated in their answer that by the law, usage and
polity of the Roman Catholic church, the title to all lands used for religious
purppses, churches, &c., is vested in the bishop of the diocese in which the
same are situated, for the use and benefit of the universal Catholic church,
and that these contributions were made under that rule, and it having been
found by the court that the legal title to the property was vested in the de-
fendant, the bishop, without any written declaration of trust, and that he was
accountable only to his ecclesiastical superiors: Held, that the said defendant
was not accountable to the congregation for his mansgemCent of the property;
that a court had no authority to take this property from the bishop and
place it in the hands of a new trustee. Id.
4. The interference of civil courts in ecclesiastical controversies discussed.
Note to Id., 276.
5. A legislative act of a synod which forfeits the franchises and property
of a congregation, is in the nature of a judicial sentence and inoperative;
it is ultra vires. .AfcAuleg and others' Appeal, 118.
COLLATERAL SECURITY. See DEBTOR AND CREDITOR, 6, 7; EQUITY, 15.
COLLISION. See ADMIRALTY, I.
COMMON CARRIER. See RAILROAD.
1. A bailee of goods, sending them by a carrier, may sue the carrier for the
delivery of the same to the consignee without payment, where payment was
imposed as a condition of delivery. Murray v. Warner, 119.
2. Is liable, notwithstanding a stipulation against liability in the bill of
lading, if injury was caused by his negligence. lVdch v. Railroad Co., 140.
3. A stipulation by a bailee for hire for exemption from the consequences
of his own negligence, has no validity, but there may be a valid stipulation
for a degree of responsibility less than that imposed by lawv. Ad.
4. Where a stipulation in such a case was open to a question as to whether
it intended an exemption from all liability or onlya limitation of the common-
law liability, and the judge charged the jury that it was void, but that the
defendants would be liable only for want of ordinary care, it was held that
the defendants were not injured by the charge of the judge ; that the stipula-
tion was void, even if it were not so, since he held them only to the degree
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of liability to which they would have been held under any construction on it.
M nrrnj Y. l'atrner, 119.
5. It is well settled that common carriers may, by contract or by notice.
restrict their common-law liabilities as insurers against purely abcidental loss
or injury. But they cannot, even by express contract, avoid liability for
negligence, nor limit it to gross negligence. Virginia 6- Tennessee Railroad.
Co. v. Sayers, 297.6. In an action against a railroad company for loss by negligence, the
declarations of a brakeman or a section master not near enough to the time
and place of the accident to be parts of the res qest(e, are not evidence. The
rule as to declarations of agents is the same for corporations as for individuals.
Id.
7. Common carriers may by special contract limit their liability as recog-
nised by the common law, where there seems to be reason and justice to sus-
tain their exemption. But where such is the case it ought to be by clear and
distinct terms. McCoy v. Erie - I1'estern Transportation Co., 439.
8. Where goods have reached their destination and the consignee is not
ready to receive them, and tile carrier puts them in store, or in charge of
careful servants, the carrier's liability as insurer ceases, and he will thereafter
be liable only as warehouseman. Rothschild v. Michigan Central Railroad Co.,
309.
CONFEDERATE STATES.
1. When an ekecutor was forced to receive Confederate money contrary to
his wishes, it was held that he was not accountable for it. BRocklhold v. Rock-
hold, 743.
2. The Supreme Court of the United States has no jurisdiction over such a
case. 1d.
3. Property purchased by the Confederate States during the war passed to
the United States at the restoration of peace by capture. Whitfield v. United
States, 679.
4. Contracts of sale made in aid of the rebellion will not be enforced by
the courts, but completed sales occupy a different position. As a genieral rule,
tie law leaves the parties to illegal contracts where it finds them, and affords
relief to neither. fid.
5. Payment in Confederate notes is no payment. Fretz v. Stover, 119.
CONFISCATION.
1. Under the Act of Congress of July 17th 1862, for the confiscation of
enemy's property, a seizure and sale.of land in which the owner, a participant
in the rebellion, had an equity of redemption, passed his whole title and left
no estate in him which le could subsequently convey. Mallach v. fun Ris-
wick, 329.
2. Nor does the joint resolution of Congress of the same date, limiting the
forfeiture to the offender's life, change the effect of the act. What is for-
feited is not a technical life-estate, but the entire estate during a limited
period. Id.
3. The property of W. was mortgaged by him to R. and subsequently was
confiscated and sold by the United States in 1863, under the Act of July 17th
1862, 11. becoming the purchaser. In 1866,:.W. and wife made a deed of the
property in fee simple to R., with covenants of general warranty. In 1872,
W. having died, his heirs filed a bill against R., to redeem as against the
mortgage, and to have the deed of W. in 1866 declared void : Held, that tile
bill would lie. Id.
CONFLICT OF LAWS. See CONSTITUTIONAL, LAW, 12; CONTRACT, 3, 4;
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR, 1 ; FERRY ; FOREIGN JUDGMENT; INSUnANCE, 5;
INTOXICATING LiQuoRs, 4.
1. The full faith and credit required to be given to records of judicial pro-
ceedings in another state, means that such records shall have the same effect
as records of home proceedings of like nature. McArthur v. Goddin, 672.
2. In actions of such records, the Statute of Limitations of the state where
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the actions are brought must govern. That statnte is a plea to the remedy
and therefore to be governed by the lexjbri. M cArthur v. (Joddin, 672.
3. The statute of Kentucky bars sny further proceeding on a judgment
after fifteen years from the last execution thereon. An action in Kentucky
cannot be maintained on aq Ohio judgment upon which no execution had
issued for more than fifteen years. Nor does it make any difference that
within fifteen years the Ohio judgment has been revived in that state. Id.
4. A judgment for alimony rendered in another state, where the only
notice to the defindant was by publication, andi he did 'not appear, and the
record does not show that he was a resident of that state, can have no force
in Indiana. MiddleworA et nx. v. McDowell, 54.
5. The laws of a foreign state operate beyond its territorial limits only ex
comitate. The courts of a state where the laws cf such foreign state are
sought to be enforced, will use a sound discretion as to the extent and mode
of that comity. Rice v. Merrimack Hosiery Co., 608.
6. A creditor of a corporation, created under the laws of Ohio, filed a bill
in New Hampshire to enforce the individual liability of the stockholders of
the corporation. The corporation had no assets in New Hampshire, and
none of its stockholders resided there. Held, that comity does not require
the courts to give effect to the statutes of Ohio. Id.
7. The act of a state legislature declaring that A. was thereby constituted
a legal heir of B. confers no capacity upon A. to acquire property beyond
the state passing the act. Barnum v. Barnum, 379.
8. A citizen of the state of Ohio may be enjoined from prosecuting an
attachment in another state against a citizen of that state, to subject to the
payment of his claim the earnings of the debtor, which, by the laws 6f that
state, are exempt from being applied to the payment of such claim. S'nook
v. Snitzer, 122.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
L Powers qf Congress. See post, 19, 20, 21, 28, 33-37.
1. In the United States the powers of government may be divided into four
classes : those which belong exclusively to the states ; those which belong
exclusively to the national government; those which may be exercised con-
currently and independently by both; and those which may be exercised by
the states, but only with the consent, express or implied, of Congress. Nat.
Bank v. Dearing, 621.
2. Rights and immunities created by or dependent upon the Constitution
of the United States, can be protected by Congress, in such form and manner
as Cbngress,.in the legitimate exercise of its legislative discretion, shall pro-
vide. United States v. Reese, 550.
3. If Congress has not declared an act done within -a state to be a crime
against the United States, the courts have no power to treat it as such. Id.
4. The fifteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States has
invested the citizens with a new constitutional right which is within the pro-
tecting power of Congress. That right is exemption from discrimination in
the exercise of the elective franchise, on account of race, color or previous
condition of servitude. .d.
5. The Act of May 31st 1870, commonly called the Enforcement Act, is
not in pursuance of this amendment, and Congress has not as yet provided
by appropriate legislation for the punishment of a violation of the provisions
of this amendment. Id.
6. The first amendment of the Constitution, which prohibits Congress from
abridging "the right of the people to assemble and to petition the govern-
ment for a redress of grievances," was not intended to limit the powers of
the state governments, but to operate on the national government alone.
United States v. Cruisank, 551.
7. This right was not created by the amendment; its continuance was only
guaranteed as against congressional interference. For their protection in its
enjoyment, therefore, the people must look to the states. Id.
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II. Powers of the State Legislatures. See ante, 3, 6; TAXATION, 2.
8. A statute of Louisiana prescribed that a commission should be prim&
facie proof of right to judicial office, and if any incumbent refused to vacate
he should be cited by rule returnable within twenty-four hours to present his
claim for adjudication before a court, which should hear the case without a
jury, and its determination should be final unless appealed from within one
day. This was "due process of law." Kennard v. State of Louisiana, 551.
9. A change of estates in fee-tail to estates in fee-simple by statute is not
an interference vith Tested rights, nor beyond legitimate legislative power.
Pollock v. Speidel, 551.
10. The provision of the Constitution of Missouri, which ordains, " The
-General Assembly shall have no power, for any purpose whatever, to release
the lien held by the state upon any railroad," was not meant, in case of a
failure by the railroad companies, to prevent the state from making a com-
promise with any railroad company of any debt due to it or to become due ;
and on the compromise being effected to release the lien. W'oodson v. Mur-
dock, 248.
11. A state has the power to subject the.property of non-residents, within
its territorial limits, to the satisfaction of the claims of 'her citizens by any
mode of procedure which it may deem proper and convenient, .and therefore
may, for such purpose, authorize a judgment to be given against such non-
resident prior to seizure of such property and with or without notice of the
proceeding. Neff v. Pennoyer, 367.
12. But where a title depending on such ex parte action comes before a
court of another jurisdiction, the proceedings will be closely examined to see
that all the statutory requirements for their validity have been complied with.
13. The common-law presumption in favor of the jurisdiction and regular-
ity of the proceedings of courts of record of general jurisdiction, had its origin
in the fact that at common law no judgment could be given against a defend-
ant until he had appeared in the action ; but no such presumption does or
ought to apply in cases where the defendant is a non-resident, and there was
no appearance, and only constructive service of the summons by publication.
14. A local option law-submitting to the people the allowing of licenses to
sell liquor is not a delegation of legislative power. Fell v. The State, 310.
15. A license to sell liquor is in no sense a contract made bythe state with
the party holding the license. It is a mere permit, subject to be modified or
annulled at the pleasure of the legislature. Id.
16. Where a law is signed by the speakers of both houses, and approved
by the governor, there is a presumption, only to be overcome by clear proof,
that it has been legally and constitutionally passed. Larrison v. Peoria, At-
lanta 6- Decatur Railroad Co., 438.
17. A license tax required for the sale of goods is in effect a tax upon the
goods themselves. lWelton v. State of Missouri, 165.
18. A statute of Missouri which requires the payment of a license tax from
persons who deal in the sale of goods, which are not the produce of the state,
by going from place to place to sell the same in the state, and requires no
such license tax from persons selling in a similar way goods which arc the
produce of the state, is unconstitutional. Id.
19. The inaction of Congress in prescribing rules to govern inter:state
commerce is equivalent to its declaration that such commerce shall be free
from any restrictions. Id.
20. A tax demanded of the master or owner of a viessel for each passenger
is a regulation of commerce by the state, in conflict with the Constitution and
laws of the United States, and therefore void. Ienderson v. WVickam, 740.
21. As to statute of California taxing immigration. Chy Lung v. Freeman,
741.-
22. If the right of the states to pass statutes to protect themselves in regard
to the criminal, the pauper and the diseased foreigner landing within their
borders, exists at all, it is limited to such laws as are absolutely necessary
for that purpose. Id.
23. The legislature may, in matters purely local and municipal, enact
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conditional laws, and permit the people or proper municipal authorities to
decide whether such laws shall have force in their respective municipalities.
Slinger v. llansman, 185.
II". Takinq Prirate Propertq-Emninent Domain. See COURTS, 6.
24. After damages have been assessed, on a condemnation of land for a
railroad, the trees which may be useful in the construction of the road, stand-
ing on the tract taken, become the property of the company. Taylor v. Neo
York 4- Long Branch Railroad Co., 122.
25. Where a legal and illegal assessment for benefits are so blended that
they cannot be.separated, the whole assessment will be set aside ; but appli-
cation may be made for a re-assessment. Syste v. Plainfie!d, 122.
26. Where the charter provides for constructive notice of improvements by
publication, personal notice is not required. S'alte, Boicepro3., v. Plainfie!d,
122.-
27. It is the right of a landowner especially affected by a public improve-
ment, to be informed either by actual or constructive notice of the time and
place appointed for the meeting of counsel to consider their proposed action. Id.
28. RIGHT AND POWER or EmiNENT DOmAIN IN TU NATIONAL Gov-
ERNMENT, 193.
29. The laying of taxes is a legislative function, and the policy and expe-
diency of it, as well as its amount, arc qnestions exclusively for that depart-
ment of the state. Perriy et al. v. Citl of Krene, 397.
30. There is no abstract legal principle by which to determine whether a
use is public; a court must decide it as a conclusion of factand public policy,
in the same manner as the legislature. Hence. while it is clearly the duty
of a court to determine finally what ii a public purpose, it will only decide
adversely to the judgment of the legislature in a clear case. d.
31. If a purpose is public, it makes no difference that the agent, by whom
it is to be carried out is a private individual or corporation. id.
32. The building of a railroad is a public purpose ; and a statute authoriz-
ing a town to vote money to aid in such purpose, even though the money is
to be given as a gratuity and not as a subscription to stock, is not unconstitu-
tional as a taking of private property for a private use. Id.
33. The right of eminent domain is inherent in all governments. For all
purposes required by the constitution, this right exists in the United States
independently of any consent of the state in which the property lies. Eohl
v. United Statks, 514.
34. Such state can neither control the right nor prescribe the mode of its
exercise. Its consent is necessary, if at all, only for the transfer of exclu-
sive jurisdiction and right of legislation after the land has been acquired. Id.
35. Semble, a state has no power to condemn and take lands for the use
of the United States. The correct mode is a proceeding by the United States
directly. Id.
36. The word purchase is technically large enough to include an acquisi-
tion by taking under the right of eminent domain, but as used in statutes
generally it means only an acquisition by contract between the parties with-
out government interference. In connection, however, with the words "at
private sale or by condemnation," it includes the authority to take land by
virtue of eminent domain. Id.
37. A proceeding to take lands for public use, is a suit at common law
within the language of the Judiciary Act of 1789, and where Congress has
not prescribed any other tribunal, the Circuit Court has jurisdiction. Id.
IV. filitarg Courts.
38. The Constitution did not prohibit the creation by military authority of
courts for the trial of civil causes during the civil war in conquered portions
of the insurgent states. The establishment of such courts was the exercise
of the ordinary rights of conquest. 3lechanics' and Traders' Bank v. Union
Bank, 185.
39. Whether such court acted within its jurisdiction in a case where one bank
of the state of Louisiana was claiming from another bank of the same state in a
large sum of money, is a question exclusively for the state tribunals. d.
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V. Powers of Judiciary. See ante 3. 30; CORPORATION, 9.
40. The right of the judiciary to declare a statute void for unconstitution-
ality is only to be exercised in clear cases, and this rule applies with especial
force to decisions upon motions for provisional injunctions. Lothrop v. &ed-
man, 346.
VI Title of Act.
41. It is sufficient if the title of an act fairly give notice of its subject so as
reasonably to lead to an inquiry into the body of the bill. State Line Rail-
road Co.'s Appeal, 119.
CONTEMPT.
Punishments for contempt of court have two aspects, namely : 1. To vindi-
cate the dignity of the court ; 2. To compel the performance of some order
or decree. In re Chiles, 120.
CONTRACT. See CONFEDERATE STATES, 4; CORPORATION, 9, 10; HUSBAND
AND WIFE, 7.
1. Government bonds were deposited in a bank ; the depositor alleged that
the bank bought them from him at par, fraudulently informing him that there
was no premium on them, when there was, within the knowledge of the bank.
The depositor sued the bank for the premium and declared in the common
money counts : Held, that the depositor could not recover on those counts.
Sankey's Executors T. Bank, 309.
2. If the bonds were purchased by the bank in good faith at par, although
they were then selling in the market at a premium, of which both parties
were ignorant, the depositor could not, on the ground of mutual mistake, re-
cover the bonds or the premium on them. Id.
3. The agent of a foreign liquor-selling establishment obtains an order
which he sends to his employers for approval. Held, that there is no com-
pleted contract until the order is approved and accepted, and that if that is
done outside of the state, it is a foreign contract, and not void as in violation
of the liquor law of Michigan. Kling v. Fries, 381.
4. Illegality and bad faith are not to be presumed against a foreign con-
tract, but must be shown. Id.
5. Agreements in restraint of trade to be valid must be limited in time or
partial in their operation and supported by a sufficient consideration. Hark-
inso,'s Appeal, 376.
6. That a court of equity may enjoin against the free exercise of a trade,
the violation of the agreement should not be doubtful. Id.
7. When damages will compensate the benefit derived or the loss suffered,
equity will not interfere by injunction. Id.
8. A contract having for its consideration an agreement to suppress a crim-
inal prosecution is void. Kimbrough v. Lane, 389.
9. It is equally so, if any part of the consideration was the suppression of
the prosecution, and whether the contract was induced by promises or threats
on one side or the other. Id.
10. It is not necessary that the promise should be made at the same time
as the contract; it is sufficient if it was made prior thereto, and was acted
upon as a part of the consideration or inducement. Id.
11. Nor does it make any difference that a prosecution is already commenced
and is in the hands and under the control of the Commonwealth's officer, if
the private prosecutor, as consideration for the contract, promises to abandon
his own efforts in the coui'se of justice. The particular interest of the party in-
jured, in bringing the offender to justice, is one of the securities of the public
in the enforcement of the laws, and any agreement by which this interest is
turned against the Commonwealth 13 void. Id.
12. Terms are to be interpreted in the sense the parties employ them, though
contrary to the accepted meaning. But such special meaning must be plain.
MecCo v. Transportation Co., 438.
13. As to conditional subscription to stock. ee Baker v. IWhite, 552.
14. A contract signed by one party and accepted by the other is binding
on both. Brandon Manufacturing Co. v. Morse, 680.
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15. A written contract for the sale and delivery of a certain quantity of
wood at a stipulated price per cord, not, in terms, fixing the time of payment,
is payable on demand after delivery. Birandon Manufacturing Co. v. Morse,
680.
16. Where the secretary of the navy possesses the power to enter into con-
tracts for the construction of vessels of war, and a suspension of the work
is ordered, he is authorized to settle with the contractor upon the compensation
to be paid for the partial performance of the contracts, and such a settlement
made in good faith is equally binding upon the government as upon the con-
tractor. United States v. Corliss Steam Engine Co., 619.
17. Defendant bought 4000 barrels of oil from plaintiff, and eight similar
papers of same date were executed by them, each for the delivery of 500
barrels on the last day of consecutive months, payment to be made on each
delivery. Held, not to be an entire contract. forgan v. McKee, 54.
18. The plaintiff, on demand, refused to deliver the oil due on one of the
appointed days ; the defendant, on the next day for delivery, gave notice of
rescission, ou the ground of the previous default. Held, the plaintiff might
recover for refusal of defendant to accept and pay for the oil which was ten-
dered on the days appointed for the subsequent deliveries. d.
19. The right to rescind a contract must be exercised within a reasonable
time after the breach. What is a reasonable time, is for the court. Id.
20. Evidence was inadmissible, that at the time of the purchase it was
agreed that it was an entire contract, and that the several papers were exe-
cuted with that understanding and according to the custom of the trade. Id.
"21. A simple contract given for the same debt will merge in a specialty,
except where one is intended to be simply collateral to the other. Leonard
v. ughlett, 59.
22. The policy of the law forbids that a person acting as the friend and
confidential adviser of a purchaser, should at the same time be secretly re-
ceiving compensation from the seller for effecting the sale; and a contract
for such compensation is void. Bellman v. Loomis, 75 ; and see BROKER, 2, 3.
CORPORATION. See CO.VIsON CARRIER, 6; CONTRACT, 13; COUNTS, 5;
JUDGMENT, 4; 'MASTER AND SERVANT, 7, 8; NATIONAL BANK, 2; TRUST, 8.
1. The treasurer of a corporation is the proper officer charged by law with
the custody of its funds, and responsible for their safe-keeping. The direc-
tors cannot lawfully deprive the corporation of the benefit of this responsi-
bility by depositing the funds with others for safe-keeping, and may be
restrained by injunction from so doitig. Pearson v. Towzr, 120.
2. Employees of a defaulting railroad company are not to be considered as
creditors at large of the company in regard to their claims for wages in ar-
rears at the time of the appointment of a receiver for the company. Duncan
v. C'helpeake 4- Ohio lailroad Co.. 428.
3. When mortgagces come into a court of equity seeking satisfaction of
their claims against a railroad company by suit for foreclosure, they should be
required to satisfy all arrearages of pay due employees out of the trust pro-
perty or its future earnings. id.
4. A foreign corporation can do business in Ohio. Mewbury Petroleum Co.
v. Meare, 741.
5. A subscription to the capital stock of a railroad company on the condi-
tion that its railroad shall pass through a certain place, becomes absolute on
the location of the road through the place named. Mansfield, 4-c., Railroad
Co. v. Stout, 680.
6. County authorities cannot hold out any offer to a railroad company to sub-
scribe to its stock, prior to any vote of the people, upon which the company
has a right to rely. The People v. Car Co., 446.
7. The principle that a stockholder of a company cannot maintain a bill
in equity against a wrongdoer to prevent an injury to the corporation, unless
it shall be averred, and shall affirmatively appear, that the corporation has
refused to take measures to protect itself, does not extend to a bill which is
in good faith filed by a creditor. Lathrop v. Stedman, 346.
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8. A holder of a policy in an insurance company is a creditor within this
rule. Lathrop V. Stedman, 346.
9. A charter is a contract between the state and the corporators, and the
corporation takes the grant subject.to the limitations contained in the net of
incorporation. If no power of repeal is reserved, none can he exercised ;
but when a charter itself or a general statute provides that the charter is sub-
ject to repeal by the legislature., at its pleasure, without restrictions or condi-
tions limiting the power of repeal, the legislature has the right to exercise its
power summarily'and at will, and its action, being a legislative and not a
judicial act, cannot be reviewed by the courts, unless it should exercise its
power so wantonly and carelessly as to palpably violate the principles of nat-
ural justice. Id.
10. A repeal of a charter does not of itself violate or impair the olilga-
tions of any contract which the corporation has entered into. But the legis-
lature cannot establish such rules in regard to the mnnagement and disposition
of the assets of the corporation, that the avails shall be diverted from or di-
vided unfairly and unequally among the creditors, and thus impair the obli-
gation of contracts, or that the portion of the avails which belongs to the
stockholders shall be sequestered and diverted from the owners, and thus in-
jure vested rights. Id.
11. The legislature has the right to appoint a trustee, to take the assets and
manage the affairs of a corporation, whose charter has been repealed, in con-
formity with the general, just rules which it has prescrihed, or with the rules
of a court of equity, if no statutory provisions have been enacted. If no
trustee is appointed by the legislature, a court of equity, which never allows
a trust to fail for the want of a trustee, would see to the execution of that
trust, although by the dissolution of the corporation the legal title to the
property had been changed. Id.
12. A shareholder may personally maintain a bill against directors of a
corporation who have fraudulently mismanaged its affairs. ialt's Appeal,
440.
13. When an act of directors is in excess of their authority, but done with
a bon& fide intent of benefiting the corporation, and a shareholder, knowing
of it, does not dissent within a reasonable time, his assent will be presumed,
and he cannot gainsay it ; and when the act of the directors complained of is
to be followed by a large expenditure, the shareholder should not only make
his protest within a reasonable time, but should follow it up by active pre-
vesdive measures. Id.
14. Six years' omission to proceed would be a bar to an action against
directors for the misuse of the corporate property. It.
15. The stockholders directed public sales of'their lands, and that payment
might be made in cash and in their bonds : Held, the payment in bonds was
equivalent to cash. Id.
16. Directors bought at the sales at fair prices, and the sales were con-
ducted openly and fairly : Held, the sales to them were valid. Id.
17. Directors of a railway company cannot gratuitously give away certifi-
cates of stock to contractors building the road, for the purpose of giving them
a controlling influence in the election of its officers. Railroad Co. v. Kelley,
441.
18. Merger depends largely on intention, and this rule applies to a case
where a corporation purchases shares of its own stock. The purchase sus-
pends the right to vote on the shares, and may be a merger, if so intended ;
but if not so intended, it is not a merger, and the presumption is that the cor-
poration does not intend a merger, but to hold the stock as assets, or to sell
and reissue it. State ex rel. Page v. Smith, 466.
19. A quorum of the directors of a corporation are competent to act within
the scope of their powers and to bind the corporation, although the meeting
was not regularly called and there was no notice to the other directors. Id.
20. A sale of the company's shares of its own stock. msde at such a meet
ing of the directors, if made bonA fide and for full value, and for the purpose
of raising money to meet an urgent necessity of the company passed a good
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primf- ticie title to the shares. Any director or stockholder desiring to avoid
such sale, must proceed at once to dispute it in legal form. State cx rd. Page
v. Siih, 466.
21. If the snle is otherwise valid, .it is not vitiated by the fact that the mo-
tive of the purchaser and of some of the directors was to enable the former
to vote upon the shnres in a certain manner at an approaching election of
corporate officers. Id.
22. Where new stock is issued which is to share in profits with existing
stock, all thidholders of the latter have an equal right to subscribe for their
proportionate'part of the new stock, but this rule does not apply to original
stock bought in by the corporation and held as assets, and sold for the pay-
ment of liabilities or for the general benefit. Md.
23. Where a director lends money to his corporation, takifig a deed of trust
to secure the same, lie must act fairly and be free from all fraud and oppres-
sion. IHarls v. Brown, 553.
24. A director can loan money to a corporation when the money is needed,
and the transaction is open and otherwise free from blame. Oil Company v.
Marbury, 680.
25. An insolvent corporation cannot purchase in a portion of its capital
stock. Carrier v. Lebanon .5latc Co., 680.
26. Where shares of stock in a banking corporation have been hypothe-
cated, and placed in the hands of the transferee, ho will be subjected to all
the liabilities of ordinary owners. lVWheelock v. Kost, 558.
27. A stockholder of a banking corporation which is a corporation de facto,
who receives dividends, will be estopped from insisting when sued by its cred-
itors that the corporation was not legal. Al., 552.
28. Unpaid stock is as much a part of the assets of an insurance company
as the cash which has been paid in upon it. Sanger v. Urnton ; Upton v.
Trihilcock, 559.
29. A fraudulent representation by an agent that only 20 per cent. of the
par value was assessable, is no defeice to an action for the unpaid instal-
ments. Id.
30. The transferee of sock on which the full nominal value has not been
paid, is liable for calls on the tpaid portion made during his ownership,
without an express promise. 11"cbster v. Uplon, 638.
31. The capital stock of a business corporation is a trust fund for the pro-
tection of creditors, and neither stockholders nor directors can withhold or re-
lease any part of it from the claims of such creditors. The stock in t1l sense
is the whole stock, not merely the percentage of it called in or paid. id.
32. The subject of subscriptions to stock and the liability of holders dis-
cussed. d., note.
33. The plaintiff company was about being organized, and defendant hav-
ing subscribed his name to a paper agreeing to take ten shares, was liable as
a stockholder to assessments, although no shares designated by numbers be
assigned to him. European 4- N. A. Railway Co. v. McLeod, 592.
34. Contracts made by the promoters of a corporation before a charter is
obtained arc binding upon it, if the benefits under the contract have been ac-
cepted and enjoyed by the corporation. Bdl's Gap Railroad v. Chri.ty, 620.
35. In such case the promoters of the enterprise must be a majority of
them. A minority could not bind the association or corporation. Id.
COUNTY. See ConrORATION, 6.
1. Counties are liable for the laches or misconduct of their servants, when
special duties are assumed or imposed on them. Blannoan v. St. Louis, 664.
2. Thus, where the county of St. Louis made a contract for laying water-
pipe to the county insane asylum, the duty was not one imposed by general
law upon all countids, but o self-imposed one ; and quoad hoe the county was
a private corporation, and governed by the same rules as to its liability. In
such case it is immaterial whether the performance of the work is voluntarily
assumed in the first instance, or is a special duty imposed by the legislature,
and assented to by the county. Td.
VOL. XXIV.-96
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COUNTY.
3. And municipal and quasi corporations are, under the above circum-
stances, subject to the same doctrine of liability. .Hannon v. St. Lcuis, 664.
COURTS. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, V.; REMOVAL OF CAUSES.
1. Where a majority of the coure agree in the judgment that ought to be
rendered, but disagree as to the reason for such judgment, such judgment
must be entered. Railroad Co. v. lubbard, 620.
2. The Supreme Court of the United States will not reverse the judgment
of a territorial court on the construction of the territorial code. S weeny v.
Lomme, 126.
3. Where an appeal can be taken from an inferior court of a state to the
highest court of the same, only with leave of the latter, and that leave has
been refused, a writ of error, if there be in the case a ,1 Federal question,"
properly lies, under sect. 709 of the Revised Statutes, to the inferior court,
and not to the highest one. Gregory v. .1c Veiqh, 498.
4. A Federal question exists when-in a suit by a person who seeks to re-
cover property on the ground that a judgment and execution on it by a court
of the United States, interpreting a statute of the United States, has deprived
him of the property in violation of the first principles of law-the defendant
sets up a title under'that judgment and execution, and the decision is against
the title so set up. 1d.
5. The decision of the Supreme Court of a state that a company profess-
ing to be ti corporation under the laws of the state is legally so, is conclu-
sive. Secoenbe v. Railroad Co., 498.
6. The mode of exercising the right of eminent domain in the absence of
any constitutional provision is within the discretion of the legislature. Id.
7. A judgment of condemnation rendered by a competent court, is no more
subject to impeachment in a collateral proceeding than tile judgment of any
other court of exclusive jurisdiction. Id.
8. The Federal courts have no jurisdiction to enjoin proceedings in state
courts. Haines v. Caipenter, 552.
9. The United States courts have power under the writ of habeas corpus to
discharge persons from the custody of state officers, where it appears that they
are held under a state law which seeks to punish them for executing a law of
the United States, or where the act for which they are held was done in pur-
suance of the process of a Federal court. Ex parte IVaddy Thoompson, 522.
10. But where a party is in custody of a state officer under an indictment
fo larceny and sets up as a justification for the act complained of a writ of re-
plerin issued from a United States court, the latter court will on habeas corpus
inquire into the fact whether its writ was fraudulently obtained for the pur-
pose of carrying off the property, and if satisfied of that fact, will remand the
relator to the custody of the state officer. Id.
11. A writ regular on its face is a justification to the officer to whom it is
addressed for everything that he may lawfully do under such an authority,
but this rule does not extend to a party who has procured tile writ by fraud. Id.
12. If the highest court of a state has, after judgment, sent its records to an
inferior court, and no longer has them in its own possession, the Supreme
Court of the United States may send its writ either to tlte highest court or to
the inferior court. .Atherton v. Foioler, 560.
13. Although jurisdictioh cannot b given to the United States courts by
the consent of the parties, they may admit the existence of facts showing
jurisdiction upon which the courts may judicially act. Railway Co. v. Rain-
say, 192.
COVENANT. See WAnItANTY, 1.
1. A stipulation in a deed of conveyance, whereby the grantee, in part con-
sideration for the conveyance, agrees for himself, his heirs, and assigns, that
the premises conveyed shall not be used or occupied as a hotel, so long as
certain other property, owned by the grantor, shall be used for that purpose,
binds both the grantee and all claiming under him, and may, in equity, be
enforced by injunction. Stines v. Dormean, 121.
2. Where a builder has done a large part of the work, but yet has failed to
INDEX.
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complete a building within the time limited by his covenant, the other party
can either abandon the contract, or permit the party in default to go on, and
if hie does the latter, he cannot afterwards set up the breach as a defence to
an a'.tion for the contract price. Construction Co. v. Seymour, 553.
3. For the injury done by the failure to perform in the stipulated time, he
ma~y recover in a suit on the contract, or he may recoup, in an action on the
contract against him, for the price. Id.
4. In an action of covenant founded solely on a specialty, evidence of a
parol promise is inadmissible. Id.'
CRIMINAL LAW.. See FACTOR; INTOXICATING LIQUORS, 2, 3.
T. Generaiilq.
1. Liability to criminal punishment without criminal intent. Note to ni-
ted States v. Adler, 48.
2. The burden of showing that a confession of guilt was obtained by im-
proper inducements rests with the defendant. Rufer v. The Sttte, 120.
3. Where a witness is offered by the state to prove a confession made by
the defendant, to the admission of which testimony the defendant objects, on
the ground that the confession was not voluntary, it is the right of the de-
fendant to inquire of the witness and prove his objection before the confession
Is given in evidence. Id.
4. A verdict in a criminal case. where there has been neither arraignment
nor plea, is a nullity. Davis v. The State, 186.
5. After such a verdict, the cou:t cannot order a plea of "not guilty" to
be entered without the defendant's consent. Id.
6. A judge has power to suspend sentence, where the circumstances, in his
opinion, render the offence trifling and the law has imposed no minimum
punishment for it. ll'cavcr v. The People, 531.
7. In general, where a sentence has been omitted by the judge who tried
the case, another judge may impose the proper sentence at a subsequent time,
but where sentence lias been suspended by a judge unler circumstances that
indicate his opinion that no punishment should be inflicted, a subsequent sen-
tence by a different judge is erroneous. Id.
8. MICROSCOPICAL EXAMINATION OF BLOOD IN ITS RELATION TO CIttlIt-
NAL TRIALS, 561.
IT. ilfHrder.
9. DRUNKENNESS AS AN EXTENUATION IN CASES OF MURDER, 505.
10. Where it is shown that two or more persons acted in concert" in the
commission of an alleged murder, it is competent for the state by proper tes-
timony to show, upon the separate trial of one, the motives which actuated
the others in the alleged homicide. Rqfer v. The State, 120.
11. On a trial for murder it was competent to give evidence, for the pur-
pose of showing motive, that the prisoner and the deceased both visited the
same woman ; that just after the homicide the prisoner said he had warned
deceased not to visit her, she would prove a curse to any man, and now it
had come to pass. AfcCue v. Commonwealth, 377.
12. Unless the Commonwealth shows "ingredients" of murder in the first
degree, no presumption arises from the killing that the offence is higher than
murder in the second degree. Id.
13. If the killing was not accidental, malice and a design to kill are to be
presumed from the use of a deadly weapon. Id.
14. Where upon a conviction of murder in the first degree the record does
not show that before sentence the prisoner was asked if he had anything to
say why sentence should not be pronounced, it is error, and the sentence will
be reversed and the record remitted, that he may be sentenced afresh. Id.
III. Assault and Batteryj.
15. To make it competent for a party complained of for assault and battery,
to show that the person assaulted was quarrelsome and fractious, he must
show that he had knowledge of such fact. State v. 31eader, 55.
16. A party assaulted in such a way as to induce in him a reasonable beliefI
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that he is in danger of losing his life, will be justified in defending himself.
Roach v. The People, 441.
IV. False Pretence.
17. Where a loan is induced by the fraud of the borrower, and the lender
delivers certain bank bills without any expectation that the same bills will
be returned in payment, the borrower is guilty of obtaining money by false
pretences, but not of larceny. Kellogg v. The State, 499.
CUSTOM. See USAGE.
DAMAGES. See ACTION, 2; FERRT, 3; MALICIOUS PROSECUTION, 3-5;
MASTER AND SERVANT, I ; IEGLIGENCE, 1-5 ; TROVER, 4.
I. Municipal corporations are not liable to vindictive or exemplary damages
for personal injuries growing out of mere neglect to keep a sidewalk in a safe
condition. Chicago v. KIell, 249.
2. Where a person, on the commission of a wrongful act, becomes liable
only in consequence of his subsequent approval or sanction of it, he will be
liable'only for the real injury sustained, and will not be subject to vindictive
damages. Grund v. Van Vlec., 249.
3. Exemplary or punitive damages'in tort can only be recovered where the
injury is the result of wilful misconduct, or a conscious indifference to con-
sequences. .Milwaukee 4- St. Paul Railroad Co. v. Arms, 553.
4. In no case has a plaintiff any legal riht to exemplary damages. Such
damages depend upon the case and the cvidIence and the finding of the jur.:.
Jerome v. nith, 687.
5. Where the plaintiff, in pursuance of an agreement with the defendant,
furnished the materials and constructed a carriage for the defendant, in ac-
cordance with his order and directions, for which a stipulated price was to be
paid, and the defendant refused to receive and pay for it when completed and
tendered : Held, that in an action brought for that purpose, the plaintiff, i.
entitled to recover the contract price and interest from the time the money
should have been paid. Shawhan v. Van lVest, 153'.
6; The subject of damages in such case discussed. Id., note, 160.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR. See APPLICATION OF PAYMENTS; EQUITY, 4, 5.
I. Assignments.
1. In case of an assignment of choses in action for the benefit of creditors,
the law of the domicile of the assignor determines what is a sufficient transfer
to authorize the assignee to collect the same. Fuller v. Seiglitz, 742.
2. An assignee is a trustee for all creditors whether secured or not. 3feily's
Appeal, 618.
II. Fraudulent Conveyances or Sales. See HUSBAND AND WIFE, 16-19.
3. A sale of goods is fraudulent as to creditors, where possession is retained
by the vendor. Cutting v. Jackson, 681.
4. Nor does it alter the case that the sale was made in the presence of a
witness, where it was not attended with such publicity as would naturally
give notoriety to the transaction. Id.
5. Upon the sale of a chattel a reservation that the vendor should still have
the right to use the thing sold constitutes a secret trust, from which fraud as
to the creditors of the vendor is an inference of law. Lang v. Stockwell, 121.
6. The assignment of a collateral security to a creditor establishes a privity
of contract, which invests him with the ownership of the collateral for all
purposes of dominion of the debts assigned. Hanna v. llolton, 441.
7. When the collateral is lost by the insolvency of the debtor in it, through
the supine negligence of the creditor, he must account for the loss to his own
debtor. Id.
DEED. See BOUNDARY; EASEMENT, 8, 14.
1. A particular description in a deed will govern a general one. .Fetcher
v. Clark, 742.
2. The conditions upon which an escrow is to be delivered to the grantee
may rest in parol. , Campbell v. Thomas, 249.
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3. When the grantor still retains the right of control over the deed, it is
not an escrow. Campbell v. Thomas, 249.
4. A deed dcposited by the grantor with a third person is not an escrow
unless there is a valid contract of sale between the grantor and grantee. Id.5. There can be no delivery of a deed so long as it is within the control
and subject to the authority of the grantor. Dier v. James, 441.
6. The delivery may be to a third party authorized to receive it, and it maybe inferred from the words or acts of the party or both combined. Id.
7. On appeal from a decree reforming a deed on the ground of mistake, thetrue construction of the deed is before the court, as well as the sufficiency of
the proof of the mistake. Fryder v. Patrick, 311.
8. The regularity of an acknowledgment taken before a reputable officer is
presumed, and the burden of showing forgery or other irregularity is with the
party contesting the acknowledgment. Ilourtienne v. Schnoor, 373.
DISTILLED SPIRITS.
1. The offence of failing to efface and obliterate the stamps required by lawto be upon a package of distilled spirits at the time of emptying the package
is complete without any intent to defraud, or any purpose to -violate the law.
United States v. Adler, 45.
2. If a person causes a package of distilled spirits to be emptied, it is a
personal duty resting upon him to see that the stamps are effaced, and this
duty cannot be shifted from himself by directing another to do the same for
hin. Id."
DIVORCE. See HUsBAND AND WIFE, I.
DOG.
At common law an owner of a dog must have knowledge of its vicious
propensities to be liable for its acts. Slinger v. Ilennsman, 186.
DOWER. See JIUSDAND AND WIFE, II.
DRAFT. See BILLS AND NOTES, 19-21: BILL OF LADING.
DURESS. See INSURAnce, 21.
1. A promise extorted by terror or violence, whether on the part of the
person to whom the promise or obligation is made or that of his agent, may
be avoided on the ground of duress. Bush v. Brown, 55.
2. If a party execute an instrument from a well-grounded fear of illegal
imprisonment, he may avoid it on the ground of duress. Id.
3. A sale made through fear of arrest on a writ of trover may be avoided,
and it is not necessary to offer to rescind. Brownell v. Talcott, 55.
EASEMENT.
I. The"English doctrine of presumptive title to light and air, arising from
the uninterrupted enjoyment of it for twenty years and upward, was part of
the common law of England and of the colonies at the period of American
independence, and as such continued to be the law of Delaware. Clawson v.
Primrose, 6.
2. How far the common-law rule in regard to ancient lights has been
adopted in the United States, discussed. lId, note.
3. A court of equity will restrain the obstruction of lights by erections on
adjoining land, even where the right is unquestioned or established, only when
the privation of light and air by a proposed erection will be in such degrec
as to rander the occupation of the complainant's house uncomfortable, if it be
a dwelling-house, or if it be a place of business the privation must render the
exercise of the business materially less beneficial than it had formerly bqcn. Id.
4. A fair test 'of what is such a privation of light, &c., is the fact that a
jury would give substantial and not merely nominal damages. Id.
5. Where a common owner of two tenements, the windows of one of which
overlook the yard of the other, and receive lightand air therefrom, its shuttersswing out over such yard, and access from its fire-escapes which overhang the
yard being had to such yard, sevcrs the same by conveyances to different
766 INDEX.
EASEMENT.
persons, an easement in favor of the tenement so overlooking the other, it
being the one first conveyed, is created in respect to liazht and air, the swing-
ing of the shutters, and access to and from the fire-escapes. Havens v. Klein,
483.
6. Such easement is an apparent one. The grantee of the servient tene-
ment, the one later conveyed, is deemed to have actual notice of such ease-
ment, and takes his title subject thereto. Id.
7. In such case it is immaterial whether such severance be by deed or mort-
gage, inasmuch as by foreclosure the mortgage is ripened into a deed. Id.
8. An aqueduct not having become a legal casement, will not pass under
the word appurtenance in a deed. Spanding v. Abbot, 121.
9. Land which is covered by a party-wall remains the several property of
the owner of each half, but the title of each is qualified by the easement of
the other of support-of his building by means of the portion of the wall be-
longing to his neighbor. Ingals v. Plamondon, 220.
10. The easement of support is the only proper one attached to a 'party-
wall, and does not include a right to the unobstructed use of a flue by one of
the parties which is on the land of the other. Id.
11. The common-law rule is that where the owner of two heritages, or of
one consisting of several parts, arranged and adapted them so that one derives
a benefit from the other of an obvious and continuous character, and then
conveyed one of them without mentioning such incidental advantage or burden
of the one in respect to the other, there is an implied agreement that such
advantage and burden shall continue as before the separation of the estate.
Id.
12. In order to affect a purchaser of property with notice of an easement
in favor of an adjoining owner, the same must be continuous and apparent.
id.
13. The subject of apparent easements discussed. Id., note, 226.
14. Easements of necessity are implied in every deed of apart of grantor's
land, but whether a right of way in stairs and halls is implied by a convey-
ance of part of a house, quire. If such easement exists it is a mutual one,
and the permanent exclusion of one party by the other will at the option of
the latter extinguish the easement as to both. Dillynan v. lIoffman, 186.
15. A party having conreyed a portion of his land over which was the only
means of access to the remaining land, a right of way by necessity to the
remaining land was reserved. Pingree v. [cD e, 624.
EMINENT DOMAIN. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAv, III.
EQUITY. See CONTRACT, 6 ; CORPORATION, 1, 7, 11, 12; DEED, 7 ; HIGn-
WAy, 2, 3 ; VENDOR AND PURCHASER, 3, 8, 9.
1. It is the proper exercise of equity jurisdiction to apportion among par-
ties having a common interest in the use of a water power, the burden and
expense of such duty. Sanborn v. Braley, 56.
2. A chancellor will not always order an instrument to be delivered up to
be cancelled when he would refuse specific performance of the contract ; lie
will leave the parties to their legal remedies. Stewart's Appeal, 312.
3. This power will be exercised whenever an instrument exists which may
be vexatiously or injuriously used against a party after the evidence to im-
peach it has been lost. Id.
4. A creditor who has exhausted his remedy at law by a fruitless execution
on his judgment has the right to ask the aid of a court of equity to discover
and reach the equitable assets of his debtor. Trego et al. v. Skinnr, 377.
5. In such a case where property has been fraudulently conveyed, the sev-
eral persons to whom it has thus been conveyed may be joined with the debtor
in the hill. Id.
6. Where the facts stated in a petition are within the sole jurisdiction of a
court of equity, neither party can of right demand that the issue of fact shall
be tried by a jury. Rowland v. Entrken, 553.
7. Clear and convincing proof is required to warrant the reformation or a
written instrument on the ground of mistake. Potter v. Potter's Ex'x, 555.
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8. In proceedings in equity, whatever is essential to the rights of the plain-
tiff. and is necessarily within his knowledge, must be alleged positively in
the bill. Such convenient degree of certainty must be adopted as will give
the defendant full information of the case which he is called upon to answer.
Rice v. Hosiery Co., 608.
9. The mere receipt of money by a party not entitled, cannot of itself
create any equity in his favor. The People v. Township Board, 443.
10. Where a father made a conveyance of all his lands to his five sons upon
the consideration that lie was to have the use and control of the same during
life, for his support, a court of equity will enforce the performance of the
condition. Yoakum v. Yoakum, 442.
11. Where complainants have fixed by their own estimate the extent of
injury they would suffer from a non-observance of the condition in a contract,
they are precluded from resorting to a court of equity for relief by way of
injunction. hIahn v. Concordia Society, 442.
12. A bill of review is never sustained on strict law against equity.
Marr's Appeal, 312.
13. To a bill in Rhode Island charging the collection of money by defend-
ant he answered that lie was administrator in Massachusetts, and collected as
such. Held, that in the absence of explicit denial itewould be presumed he
collected also as administrator in Rhode Island. Ray v. Simmons, 701.
14. Where there are joint debtors and one is beyond the reach of the pro-
cess of the court, and equity has jurisdiction, a decree may be taken against
the other for the whole amount due. Lewis v. Unite'l Sates, 678.
15. It is a settled principle of equity that a creditor holding collaterals is
not bound to apply them before enforcing his direct remedies against the
debtor. Id.
16. In general, one who will be directly affected by a decree in equity, is
a necessary party to the suit; and this rule is departed from only when the
parties are too numerous. Where the grounds of action averred against sev-
eral defendants arise out of a series of transactions forming one course of
dealing, the bill is not multifarious. Supervisors of Douglas Co. v. 1Valbridge
et al., 250.
17. The objection that a case is one of legal instead of equitable cogni-
sance must be taken in the court of original jurisdiction. W allace v. Harris,
187.
18. Where plaintiff invested his funds in United States notes temporarily
and for the purpose of avoiding taxation, equity will not aid him by enjoin-
ing the state authorities from collecting the tax. Mitchell v. Commissioners,
554.
19. To enable a court of equity to entertain a bill filed to restrain a de-
fendant from violating a contract, the terms of the contract should be certain.
Caswell v. Gibbs, 444.
ERROR AND APPEAL. See TRIAL, I.
1. A party excepting to the admission of testimony is bound to state his
obiection specifically. Columbia 1Bridqc Co. v. Geisse, 122.
2. On a judgment of nonsuit the court below being better able to judge of
the force of evidence, a courtof error will not reverse unless it should plainly
appear that the plaintiff had a case that should have gone to the jury. Hav-
erly v. Mercur, 443.
3. The power of a judge to seal or allow a bill of exceptions ends with the
term at which the trial is had, unless there is an express order of the court
exteiding the time or the opposite party consents. Muller v. Elders, 554.
4. An orderof the Circuit Court reversing a judgment of the District Court
and awarding a new trial for misdirection on the law, is not a final judgment
on which a writ of error will lie. Baker v. White, 554.
5. A reviewing court on error has no control of the records of the court
below, ani cannot therefore correct or change them. Smith v. Board of Edu-
cation, 554.
6. A reviewing court may,,however, disregard any matter which is not
leitimately matter of record. Id.
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7. What shall constitute the record of a case is regulated by statute.
Sinith v. Board 01 Education, 554.
8. When a motion ibr a new trial is granted by the court in which it is
made, the judgment rendered on the new trial will not be reversed for error
in allowing such new trial. id.
9. The court will only notice such assignments of error as seem to it mate-
rial. Phillips Construction Co. v. Seymour, 558.
ESTATE. See TituST, 3.
ESTATE TAIL. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 9.
ESTOPPEL. See LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF, 6.
1. Where the owner of property hdhls out another as its owner, and inno-
cent parties are thus led into dealing with such apparent owner, they will be
protected. Anderson v. Armistead, 250.
2. One who has repudiated a contract is estopped from afterward claiming
the benefit of it. Mc Queen v. Gainbtc, 378.
EVIDENCE. Sea AGENT, 11-13; COMMON CAtRiEt, 6; CRtIMNAL LAw, 2,
8-11 ; HUSBAND D WIFE, 13; INSURANCE, 3; LIMITATIONS, 4; TRIAL, 5.
I. Generally.
1. Parl evidence is admissible to prove an independent collateral fact
about which a written contract is silent. Fustinq v. Silliran, 56.
2. A deed described the land thereby conveyed as being in "Lington," in
the county of Addison. Ifeld, that the name " Lington" was so like the
name Lincoln, that the deed was properly admitted in evidence. Armstrong
. Colby, 56.
3. In an action against a telegraph company for damages for failure to
transmit a dispatch, the original dispatch delivered to the operator must be
given in evidence, or if not, its absence must be properly accounted for before
secondary evidence thereof can be admitted. Vestern Union Tckgrapjh Co.
Y. Hopkins, 56.
4. The legislature may make that which, according to the ordinary rules
of experience, reasonably tends to prove a fact, conclusive evidence of it.
State v. IVoodford, 311.
5. Before parties were made competent witnesses, books of original entry
were the evidence, the oath of the party was supplementary. Since, the party
is a competent witness and may prove his claim as a stranger would have
done before. Nichols et at. v. Haynes, 378.
6. Lumping charges in a book would not stand as evidence, but the testi-
mony of the party that the entry was composed of items known to him to
have been furnished would be competent to go to the jury. Id.
7. The party's knowledge that the sum was correct would make it evi-
dence ; the credibility as to it would be for the jury. Al.
8. In a suit by an executor or administrator, the letters testamentary are
admissible in evidence and are conclusive of his right to sue. Mutual Life
" Ins. Co. v. Tisdale, 412.
9. But in an action between strangers, such letters are not admissible as
evidence of the death of the decedent. Id.
10. In an action by a wife upon a policy of insurance on the husband's
life in her favor, letters of administration are not evidence of the husband's
death. Id.
11. Where in an actinit for libel it appeared that the original writing on
which the suit was founded was among the records of the navy department at
Washington, it was held, that secondary evidence of its existence and con-
tents .was properly admitted. Carpenter v. Bailey, 621.
12. In replevin brought against a wife upon a liability incurred by her
husband, who'had absconded, testimony of what the husband had said and
done was inadmissible, unless the acts or statements had been in her presence
or with her knowledge. Canmpbe!l v. Quackenbush, 384.
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Il. D, clarations and Admissions.
13. In trover, the defendants claimed title to the property through B., who
turned it over to them to secure a then existing debt. Held, that the declara-
tions of B. were admissible against the defendants. Alger v. Andrews, 56.
II. Experts.
14. The opinion of persons not experts, upon the question of insanity, is
admissible in Vermont, when based upon facts within their knowledge and
observation. Hathaway v. National Lie Ins. Ci., 682.
EXCHANGE.
A warranty of title is implied in a contract of exchange as in a contract
of sale. Patee v. Pelton, 742.
EXECUTION. See CONFLICT oF LAws, 3, 6, 8; 1'ARTNERSIP, 6.
EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS. See CONFEDEnATE STATES, I;
EVIDENCE, 8.
1. The appointment as administrator de bonis non, with the will annexed,
of one who was surety on the bond of the previous executor, does not make a
debt due the estate from such executor assets in the hands of such adminis-
trator by reason of his suretyship. Shields v. Oddl, 742.
2. An executor or administrator cannot bring suit against himself for a
debt due him by his decedent. Perkins v. Perkins, 493.
FACTOR.
A commission merchant who sells for his consignors, even though he
guaranty the payment of the price, receives the proceeds of the sales in a
.fiduciarij capacity, and is liable to arrest in an action therefor. unless he has
been authorized by his consignor to use such proceeds in his own business.
Williams lfowcr Go. v. ql.nor, 251.
FALSE PRETENCE. See CRIMINAL LAW, 17.
FENCES.
A railroad company, though required to maintain side-fencing, is not
liable for the destruction of cattle suddenly let loose upon the track through
a breach in the fencing caused by a storm, and not existing long enough to
establish negligence of the company. Robinson v. Grand Trunk Bailway, 187.
FERRY.
1. The legislative grant of a ferry-franchise is valid, although the grantee
has not title to the landing-places which are named as the termini of the
ferry. Co'umbia Bridge Co. r. Geisse, 122.
2. The grant by one state of a ferry-franchise over a river which is the
boundary between it and another state is valid ; and it is not necessary that
there be concurrent action by both states. The franchise for that reason may
be less valuable, but it is good so far as his ovn property-rights are-con-
cerned, or the jurisdiction of the state making the grant extends. Id.
3. In an action to recover damages for the injury iuffered in the destruc-
tion of a ferry by the erection of a bridge, the income derived by the plaintiff
from tolls received in preceding years, is competent evidence to show the
value of the ferry. rd.
FOREIGN JUDGMENT. See CONFLICT or LAWS; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,
11-13.
1. The jurisdiction of a foreign court over the person or subject-matter is
always open to inquiry, and the court of another state is a foreign court.
Hall v. Lanning, 682.
2. A member of a partnership firm, residing In one state, cannot be ren-
dered personally liable in a suit brought in another state against him ani his
co-partners, although the latter be duly served with process, and although tie
law of the state where the suit is brought authorizes judgment to be rendered
against him. Id.
3. Nor can his co-partners, after a dissolution of the partnership, without
his consent and authority, implicate him in suits brought against the firm by
voluntarily entering an appearance for him. Id.
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FORFEITURE. See CONFISCATION.
The suhjcect of forfeiture and confiscation of enemy's property under the Acts
of Congress discussed. Arote to W1'allach v. Van Riswick-, 337.
FORMER ADJUDICATION. See ACTION, 2.
I. A privy in interest for whose use and with whose knowledge a suit is
brought is concluded by the judgment, not only as to the defendant, hut as to
the nominal plaintiff. Cole v. Farorite. 251.
2. One who fails to have a judgment set aside for fraud, is not debarred
from contesting at law a void execution sale by not having put it in issue in
his chancery suit. Bonk-er v. Charlesworth, 187.
3. A complainant may, if he chooses, make distinct controversies on the
same matter, the subjects of separate suits. Id.
4. To be a bar, must be for the same cause of action, but not necessarily
in the sameforin of action. Ilungerford's Appeal, 79.
FRAUD. See ATTORNEY, 3; DEBTOR AND CREDITOR, II. ; GUARDIAN, 2.
1. Where an account is asked on the ground of fraud, it is not sufficient to
charge fraud in general terms ; particular acts should be stated. Milarr's
Appeal, 312,
2. Fraud without damage is no ground for relief at law or in equity. Id.
3. Fraud used in obtaining a decree, being the principal point in issue,
must be established by proof before the propriety of the decree can be investi-
gated. Id.
4. Fisher sold a house to Saylor, agreeing to make good any loss of Saylor
in a resale. Saylor sold for less than he gave. In an action against Fisher
for the difference there was evidence that the sale of Saylor was collusive
and fraudulent. In answer to a point the court charged, if there was any
collusion between Saylor and his vendee in the sale then Saylor "cannot
recover more than the difference between a fair price for the house and the
amount paid to Fisher." Held to be error, the fraud would prevent Saylor
from maintaining the action. .0sher v. Saylor, 312.
FRAUDS, STATUTE OF. See ACCORD AND SATISFACTION.
1. PARTNERSHIP REALTY IN ITS RELATION TO, 391.
2. CONTRACTS RELATING TO THE PRODUCE OF LAND, 323.
3. The general rule is that a parol promise to pay the debt of another is
within the statute where it is collateral to a continued liability of the original
debtor. Townsend v. Long, 57.
4. If a parol promise be to pay absolutely or conditionally the debt of
another, due or to become due on an existing contract, it is generally within
the statute. Id.
5. The consideration for the promise is important only where it is a transfer
of the creditor's claim to the promisor, making the transaction a purchase,
or where it is a transfer of a fund pledged, set apart or held for the payment
of the debt. Id.
6. Where K. & W., by a parol agreement with a certain bank, promise
that if the bank will cash a certain draft to be drawn by and in the name of a
certain agent of theirs upon S. L. & Co., that said K. & W. will be respon-
sible for its payment, and afterwards such agent does draw such draft and the
said bank cashes the same, and afterwards said draft is dishonored by said
S. L. & Co. : Held, that the bank may maintain an action to recover from
said K. & W., on said parol'promise, the amount paid out on said draft, with
interest. Kohn v. First National Bank, 313.
7. Evidence to prove a promise to pay the debt of another as an original
undertaking and not a contract of suretyship, must be clear and satisfactory.
Haverly v. Miercur, 443.
GIFT.
1. The delivery of a chattel must be according to the nature of the article.
Bond v. Bunting, 378.
2. The Married Woman's Act, April 11th 1848, of Pennsylvania con-
strued. Id.
3. A person does not part with the legal dominion and control over money
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standing in his name in a bank, because it was there subject to his order, or
the order o/ his daughter ; nor does the delivery of the book of deposit consti-
tute a delivery of the money. Mlurry v. Cannon, 57
4 As to gifts of chattels without delivery, see note to Ray v. Simmons, 705.
GOLD. See INSURAwCE, 18.
GOVERNMENT. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1, 38; CONTRACT, 16.
1. A government de facto, in firm possession of any country, is clothed
while it exists with the same rights as a government dejure. Phillip; v.
Payne, 683.
2. For certain purposes the states of the Union are regarded as foreign to
each other. Id.
3. The state of Virginia is defacto in possession of the county of Alexan-
dria, and her title has been undisputed since she resunmed possession under the
Act of Congress of July 9th 1846. The United States has no power, there-
fore, to consider the legislation of Virginia in reference to the county of
Alexandria as void and of no effect. Id.
GUARANTY.
1. The obligation of one signing and sealing a guaranty, which it was in-
tended should be signed by him alone, is not impaired by the fact that the
guaranty concluded "in witness whereof we have hereunto set our hands and
affixed our seal. fitchtll v. AlcClearg, 379.
2. If a guaranty is absolute, and not a mere offer to guarantee, notice of
its acceptance is not required to make the guarantor liable thereon. Id.
3. To constitute a valid guaranty, there must be a sufficient consideration,
a delivery by the guarantor, nn acceptance by the person to whom it is given,
a subsequent delivery of goods or other property under and in accordance with
its terms, and, if it is collateral, request of payment and notice of non-pay-
ment. March v. 1'un'q, 499.
4. Nntice is not necessary when the undertaking is absolute. ITd.
5. Where the person for whose benefit the guaranty is given becomes in-
solvent, so that-no advantage can arise to the guarantor, notice is unneces-
sary. Id.
GUARDIAN AND WARD.
1. A guardian may within a reasonable time be called to file and settle his
account, although lie may have made a settlement with the ward on his ar-
rival at age. Marr's Appeal, 312. ,
2. Where there was a settlement with the ward, and a release to the guar-
dian after she came of age, and on the joint application of the ward qnd her
guardian, a decree made discharging the guardian, the decree could not be
vacated without proaf of some specific act of fraud in obtaining it, or of some
injury occasioned by it. Id.
HABEAS CORPUS. See COURTS, 9, 10.
ha4beas corpus is not the proper remedywhere the relator has been convicted
and sentenced for a criminal offence ; if errors have occurred in the proceed-
ings or sentence, a writ of error is the proper remedy. Ex parte Man Hagan,
123.
HAWKERS AND PEDLERS.
1. The legislature under the police power might prohibit entirely the busi-
ness of hawking and peddling ; and the power to prohibit includes the power'
to license. Morrill v. The State, 188.
2. Act of 1870 of Wisconsin construed. Id.
HEIR. See CONFLICT oF LAWS, 7.
HIGHWAY. See MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 1, 3.
1. As to Act of April 28th 1870, of Pennsylvania. See City of Philadel-
Ih,'t's Appeal, 313.
2. In a bill for injunction, if the question is doubtful, it is decisive against
thu injunction. 1d.
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3. No usage, however long continued, will justify an encroachment upon a
highway ; but such encroachment, to he remedied by injunction, must be
really an obstruction to the free use of the highway. Citj o " Philadel-
phia's Appeal, 313.
HOMESTEAD.
1. Under the law of Wisconsin only the actual home of the debtor is
exempt, and the absence which will not destroy the exemption is one for a
temporary purpose, with the certain intention of returning. Jarvis v. Aloe,
188.
2. A person cannot have two homes at the same time ; and such a removal
as gains a new home is an abandonment of the old. Id.
3. The presumption is that a person is at home where he is found living;
but this presumption may be rebutted by showing his abode temporary, and
his home elsewhere. Id.
HUSBAND AND WIFE. See EVIDENCE, 10, 12 ; INSURANCE, 19-21 ; Lit-
ITATIONS, STATUTE or, 5.
I. ilarriage and Divorce.
1. Where an illicit connection has once existed, the presumption is that
the connection between the parties continued to be illicit, until that presump
tion is overcome by distinct proof of marriage. Barnum v. Barnum et al.,
379.
2. Marriage may be proved in civil cases, other than actions for seduction,
by reputation, declarations and conduct of the parties ; but where reputation
in such case is divided or singular opinion it amounts to no evidence at all.
Id.
3. The declarations of a mother as to the marriage of her son, are admis-
sible after her death, to show that one who claimed and was admitted to be
his son, was illegitimate. Id.
4. General repute in a family, proved by surviving members of it, is ad-
missible upon a question of marriage. Id.
5. Upon a question of legitimacy the declarations of a father that his son
was illegitimate are competent evidence. Id.
6. A decree pro confesso cannot be made upon a libel in divorce. If either
party does not attend, the court must decide on testimony taken ex parle. Kit-
born v. Field et tx., 380.
7. A contract between husband and wife, pending proceedings in divorce,
to pay her a sum of money, the consideration of which was, in whole or in
part, that she would not oppose the divorce, is void. .d.
H. Dower. -
8. A father died, leaving a widow. His homestead descended to his two
sons. In consideration of their having the use and income of the whole es-
tate, the sons, in writing, promised the widow an occupancy of a portion
of the premises, and certain farm stock for her use, and a certain
yearly payment. Afterwards, one son conveyed to the other. The latter then
conveyed the entire premises to his mother by a warranty deed. Then he
died, leaving a widow. In an action of dower by the widow of the son,
against the widow of the father, it was held, that there are two dowers in the
estate ; the senior widow having one-third of the whole, and the junior widow
one-third of the remaining two-thirds, as dower ; and that the junior widow
is not now, nor will she be at the death of the senior widow, dowable in any
greater proportion thereof. 11cLeery v. HlcLeery, 424.
9. Under the Ohio Dower Act an estate conveyed as jointuremnust be such
an estate, as to certainty and kind, that the wife, on the death of her husband,
may take possession of, and hold in severalty, and not in common with oth-
ers. Grogan v. Garrison, 652.
10. An antenuptial contract which conveys an undivided one-third part, or
any other interest in common with others, in lieu of dower, is not a good
statutory bar. Id.
11. Whether such an estate will constitute a good equitable jointure de-
pends on the facts and circumstances of the case, and when such contract is
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pleaded, the facts, and not the pleader's conclusions, must be stated. Grogan
v. Garrison, 652.
12. The antenuptial covenant of a woman, that she will not claim dower,
cannot, in an action by her for dower, operate to bar such action, either by
way of release or estoppel, where such antenuptial contract does cofistitute
either a legal or equitihle bar. Id.
13. In a proceeding to have a deed declared fraudulent and void as against
the rights of the widow of the grantor, his declarations to the conveyancer
with respect to the deed, and his object and purpose in making it, being con-
temporaneous with its preparation and execution, are admissible in evidence.
Sanbnrn v. Lang, 57.
III. Separate Estate. See BANKRUPTCY, 20; GIFT, 2.
14. A wife may charge her separate estate to pay her husband's debts.
Stephen v. Beale et ix., 252.
15. Where articles of household furniture were purchased bya husband for
his wife, and she agreed to reimburse him, having a separate estate, it was
hdd that the agreement was valid. 31yers et al. v. King. 314.
16. A gift from a husband, who is insolvent, to his wife, is in prejudice of
the rights of subsisting creditors, and she takes no title. Id.
17. A husband borrowed from his wife a note given her for her separate es-
tate, and gave her a note for the amount; this note he afterwards secured by
assigning to her use a judgment he had paid off. Hdd not a fraud on cred-
itors. Drury v. Brilcoe, 379.
18. In order to defeat a settlement made by a husband upon his wife, it
must be intended to defraud existing creditors, or creditors whose rights are
expected shortly to supervene, or creditors whose rights may and do so
supervene. Smith et al. v. Vodges, 743.
19. As to part payment for property by wife and part by insolvent husband,'
see Sh(affer v. Fthian, 684.
20. Where land was bought and improved by a wire with money acquired
before marriage and with her subsequent earnings, and the husband acqui-
esced for fifteen years in her holding the land in her own name, it was held
that in a controversy between the parties after a divorce, the property be-
longed to the wife. Jackson v. Jackson, 557.
IV. Contracts and Conctyances.
21. The contract of a married woman to pay for services of an attorney in
prosecuting a libel for divorce against her husband is not binding. tVhipple
v. Giles, 113.
22. A married woman cannot bind herself by a mere personal contract so
that an action can he maintained against her after the coverture has ceased,
nor will such contract he implied against her by reason of services rendered
during her coverture. Id.
23. As to statutory validation of previous conveyance of land by husbanl
and wife, see Randall v. Kreiger, 500.
24. Weyman, by parol bought land from O'Hara, took possession, made
improvements and paid part of the purchase-money. His wife borrowed the
remainder oP the purchase-money from Butterfield, paid it to O'Hara, who
made the deed to her, and she mortgaged to Butterfield, the husband not join-
ing. Hdd, that the husband owning.the equitable title, could not compel a
conveyance of her legal title without refunding the purchase-money she had
paid. Butter:field's Appeal, 123.
25. Butterfield recovered judgment against the wife on his mortgage ; the
land was sold by the sheriff on a municipal claim against both husband and
wife. Held, that this divested the title of both and in the distribution of the
proceeds, Butterfield was entitled on his judgment to recover the amount of
the wife's interest in the fund, being the purchase-money which she had paid.
rd.
IDEM SONANS. See EVIDENCE, 2.
INFANT. See MISNOMER; PARENT AND CHILD.
1. Where infants purchased Aland and gave purchase-money mortgages,
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their electing to retain possession after reaching their majority, was a ratifica-
tion. Calles v. Day, 189.
2. Where an infant purchases a chattel and gives q purchase-money mort-
gage, he cannot, on the grdund of infancy, avoid the mortgage without also
avoiding the purchase. Curtiss v. MAcDougall, 500.
3. 'laintiff was present and assenting when his minor daughter entered
into a contract in writing with a school hoard, as teacher, which was signe't
by her in her own name, and not by him. In the absence of other proof of
any intention on his part to relinquish his right to her wages : Held, that he
may maintain an action against the board for such (unpaid) wages. .1Mona-
ghan v. School District, 252.
4. As to the School Act of 1872 of Wisconsin. d.
INJUNCTION. See CONTRACT, 6 ; COVENANT, I ; EQUITY, 11, 19 ; I1IoIt-
WAY, 2, 3; WATERS AND WATERCOURSES, 2.
INNKEEPER. See RAILROAD, 7, 8.
INSANITY. See EVIDENCE, 14 ; INSURANCE, 22 ; WILL, 1.
INSOLVENT. See CORPORATION, 25, 28, 31 ; DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.
INSURANCE. See CORPORATION, 8; EVIDENCE, 10 ; SET-OFF, 5 ; WAR, 1.
I. Generally.
1. Where a policy of insurance containing an acknowledgment of the receipt
of the premium, has been issued and delivered to the assured, the insurance
company will not be permitted to allege a want of consideration for its promise
when sued thereon, after a loss has happened. Ins. Co. v. Cashow, 58.
2. A life-policy reciting tile payment of the first quarterly premium cannot
be disproved by the insurance company. Teu:onia Life Ins. Co. V. Muller,
444.
3. The testimony of experts and particularly of underwriters is always
admissible upon the question of the materiality of circumstances affecting the
risk. Leech v. Ins. Co., 532.
4. Where property is insured, and the insurer re-insures, and it is destroyed
by fire, and before the loss is paid, the original insurer becomes bankrupt,
and the assured receives but a small dividend out of the bankrupt's estate,
the re-insurer is still liable to pay the whole amount of the re-insurance to
the trustee of the original insurer, without deducting the dividend, and the
original assured has no claim in respect of the money so paid. Consolidated
.Ins. Co. v. Cashew, 58.
5. On a bill of interpleader filed in a Maryland court, to settle the con-
flicting claims of two parties under a policy of insurance made payable in
Philadelphia, growing out of an assignment of the policy made in tile city
of New York, both parties having appeared to tile suit, the case must be dis-
posed of according to the law of Maryland. Whiridqe v. Barry, 339.
1I. Conditions, 4-c., in Policies.
6. An over-valuation of property by the insured, is a fraud upon the in-
surance company that avoids the policy, but it is a question of good faith.
Fire Ins. Co. v. Vaughan, 555.
7. Policies like other contracts, are to receive a reasonable construction,
so as not to defeat the intention of the parties. IWVest v. Citizens' Ins. Co.,
599.
8. A policy issued to a mercantile partnership on a stock of goods owned
by the firm and with which they are carrying on business is not avoided by
a sale by one partner to his copartners, who continue the partnership business,
of his interest in the stock of goods. Id.
9. In case of loss after such sale and transfer, the remaining partners,
being the real parties in interest, should sue on the policy, and in such action
they are not limited in the amount of recovery to their interest in tile part-
nership goods before such sale and transfer, but can recover for tile whole
loss. Id.
10. A policy of insurance which contains a condition that the insured pro-
perty shall not be alienated or encumbered, may be avoided by the insurer
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where a sale or encumbrance is effected without his consent. Home Ins. Co.
v. Lindsey, 685.
11. In an action on a policy of insurance which contains a condition, the
petition must allege performance of the condition. Id.
12. A policy that if the interest insured be not in fee simple in case of real
estate, or absolute as to personal property, such must be made known to the
company, and expressed in the policy, means when the united interest of the
insured in the property was less than absolute. Jank-in Y. Andes Ins. Co., 58.
13. The owner may sue in his own name, although it may be written on
the face of the policy : "Loss, if any, payable to A. B., as mortgagee."
Martin v. Franklin .ire Ins. Co., 229.
14. The direction on the policy to pay to the mortgagee is not an assign-
ment of the policy. Its legal effect is that of a direction in advance as to the
mode of payment, which, when made, is performance in the manner agreed
to by the insured. Id.
15. In an action on such a policy in the name of the insured, if the insurer
has paid the insurance-money to the mortgagee, he may plead such payment
as performance, and the rights of the mortgagee can be protected, and the
insurer obtain indemnity against a subsequent suit by the mortgagee by the
payment of the money into court. Id.
III. Marine Insurance.
16. In nil contracts of marine insurance there are certain implied condi-
tions which are of the same force as if written in the policy, and are distin-
guishable from mere representations. LEctch v. Atlantic Mit. Ins. Co., 532.
17. Among these conditions, in case of an insurance on cargo, is that it
shall be stowed in a safe and proper manner and in the usual and customary
place for the carriage of goods of the kind insured. Any breach of this con-
dition by which the risk is varied and the perils increased avoids the policy.
Id.
18. Gold being stowed in the rear of the vessel under the cargo, and the
testimony being clear that that was not the customary place and was a place
of greater hazard than the cabin, where coin is usually stowed, the judge
should have directed the jury, as a matter of law, that that was a material
variation of the risk. Id.
IV. Lfe Insurance.
19. A policy of insurance taken on the life of a husband for the sole use of
his wife, and payable to her or her assigns, is a ciose in cction of the wife's,
which she has the right to assign orotherwise dispose of with her husband's
consent. Whitridge v. Barry, 339.
20. The signature of afene covcrt to the assignment of a policy of insurance
effected for her sole use, made with the consent of her husband is sufficient,
without his signature. But whatever the nature of the transfer, from regard
to the interests of husband and wife, it must be made with the concurrence
of the husband, express or implied. Id,
21. A policy of insurance was taken on the life of a husband for the sole
use of his wife, and payable to her or her assigns. The wife, influenced by
the importunity of her husband, amounting to duress, attached her signature
to a blank printed form not attached to the policy, without name of assignee
or date, or designation of the policy, and with no direction from her as to
filling the blanks or delivery of the assignment or policy. B. having
advanced to the husband certain promissory notes to a large amount, which
lie had finally to pay, upon the faith of the husband's securing him by the
assignment of policies of insurance and other property, the husband caused
the assignment to be filled up with a transfer of the policy aforesaid to B.,
and delivered this assignment and subsequently also the policy itself to B.
Upon the death of the husband, in a contest between the wife and the assignee
of B. (for the benefit of creditors), as to which was entitled to recover on the
policy, it was held, 1. That B.'s assignee could claim no greater right than
B. held in the policy; 2. That the wife was entitled to recover. Id.
22. Insanity, whereby all power of self-will is lost, will excuse the act of
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suicide, and prevent the avoidance of a life insurance policy. Ifathaway's
Adm'r v. National Life Ins. Co., 684.
23. A policy of life insurance which stipulates for the payment ofan annual
premium is not an insurance from year to year, hut the premiumhs contitute
an annuity, the whole of which is the conqideration for the entire assurance
for life. Neow Y rk.Lyfe Ins. Co. v. Statham, 724.
24. But the time of payment in such policies is material, and of the essence
of the contract; and failure to pay involves an absolute forfeiture, which
cannot be relieved against in equity. Id.
25. If failure to pay the annual premium be caused by the intervention of
war between the territories in which the insurance company and the assured
respectively reside, which makes it unlawful for them to hold intercourse, the
policy is nevertheless forfeited if the company insist on the conlition ; but in
such case the assured is entitled to the equitable value of the policy arising
from the premiums actually paid. Id.
26. This equitable value is the difference between the cost of a new policy
and the present value of the premiums yet to be paid on the forfeited policy
when the forfeiture occurred, and may be recovered in an action at law or
suit in equity. Md.
27. The doctrine of revival of contract, suspended during the war, is one
based on considerations of equity and justice, and cannot be invoked to revive
a contract which it would be unjust or inequitable to revive-s where time
is of the essence of the contract, or the parties cannot be made equal. Id.
28. The average rate of mortality is the fundamental basis of lite assurance,
and as this is subverted by giving to the assured the option to revive their
policies or not.after they have been suspended by war (since none but the sick
and the dying would apply), it would be unjust to compel a revival against
the company. Id.
INTEREST. See Usuny.
1. Under the Ohio statute, parties may stipulate in a note for any rate of
interest not exceeding 8 per cent. per annum, and such note, after maturity,
without an express agreement to that effect, will continue to bear the stipu-
lated rate until payment. Marietta Iron llorks v. Lottimer, 192.
2. A judgment taken on such a note for the amount due, including unpaid
interest, will bear the stipulated rate of interest only, without rests, until pay-
ment. Id.
3. A special rate of interest continues under the Ohio statute after the time
agreed upon has expired. Mlonnott v. Sturges, 124.
4. Where a party agrees, by note, to pay a certain sum at the expiration
of a year, with interest on it at a rate named, and does not pay, it bears
interest not at the specified rate but at the customary or statute rate. Burn-
Aisel v. Firman, 124.
5. If, however, the parties calculate interest and make a settlement upon
the basis of the old rate, and the debtor gives new notes and a mortgage
for the whole on that basis, the notes and mortgage are, independently of
the Bankrupt Act, and of any statute making such securities void in tote
as usurious, valid securities for the amount which would be due on a calcula-
tion properly made. They are bad only for the excess. Id.
INTERNATIONAL LAW. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 38; GOVERNsMENT;
INSIJRANCE, 25-28 ; WAR, 1, 4.
INTERPLEADER.
Where a bill of interpleader is filed, the holder of the money cannot claim
part of it. Cogswell v. Armstrong, 444.
INTOXICATING LIQUORS. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 14, 15; CON-
TRACT, 3.
1. When the charter of a municipal corporation gives the common council
power to license inns and taverns, and also power to license wholesale liquor
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dealers, liquor cannot be sold by the quart without license, in violation of a
city ordinance. Roberson v. Lamberlville, 124.
2. A complaint which charges that the complainant had just capse to sus-
pect, and does suspect, that the defendant is guilty of violating the city ordi-
nance, without averring that he is guilty, is not made with such reasonable
certainty as to be the ground of a judicial determination, conviction and sen-
tence. Id.
3. Upon indictment for selling intoxicating liquor to a minor, it does not
matter that the defendant did not know that such person was a minor. Fir-
* me" v. The People, 501.
4. Roethke was sued for beer furnished by defendant in error, a corporation
located in Milwaukee. The beer was sold after verbal negotiations with an
agent, carried on at Roethke's store in Saginaw City. The jury found the
transactions were sales and not agency. Part of the beer was sent under the
Saginaw City negotiations, and the sale was held by the court below to have
been void under the Michigan liquor law. The remainder was sent from
Milwaukee on separate orders, held to be valid foreign contracts : Held, that
as the verbal agreement made in this state was not sufficient under the Statute
of Frauds to cover future orders, and as those therefore stood on their own
merits, and the sales and shipments were in Milwaukee, the rulings on these
were correct-as there was a contract made there which would have been
valid at common law, and which must he presumed to be valid, under which
the~e latter sales were made. Roethlke v. Brewing Co., 444.
5. The court below refused to allow the money paid for the unlawful pur-
chases to be set off against the demand in suit for the rest: Hdd, that this
was error. Id.
INTOXICATION. See CRIMINAL LAw, 9.
JOINT DEBTORS. See ACTION, 3, 4 ; EQUITY, 14; LIMITATIONS, 2.
JOINT TENANT. See VENDOR, 9.
When one of four joint tenants makes a mortgage of land conveyed to the
four, on a bill filed to foreclose the mortgage, it is not necessary to make the
three who do not join in the mortgage, parties defendant to the bill. Stephen
v. Beal a ux., 251.
JOINTURE. See HUSBAND AND WIFE, 9-12.
JUDGMENT. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, 11.
1. As a genernl rule, none but parties to a judgment can have it set aside.
AiXtna Ins. Co. v. Aldrich, 251.
2. But where the nominal party to an action is not the real party in interest,
the latter is treated as having a standing in court, and may have control of
the action. Id.
3. A party is not chargeable with laches for failing to give a supersedeas
bond on suing out a writ of error. Id.
4. If a judgment is rendered against a corporation, the proceeding, if regu-
lar in other respects, will not be vitiated hy a mere mis-recitation of the name
of the corporation. Wlilton Co. v. Humphreq, 319.
JUDICIAL SALE. See SHERIFF'S SALE.
JUROR. See MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 2.
STICE OF THE PEACE.
Great allowance must be made in the proceedings of justices of the peace
for their ignorance of legal phraseology. Wilton Co. v. Humphrey, 319.
LANDLORD AND TENANT. See AGENT, 4.
1. A seizure of property as abandoned by the United States military au-
thorities, exempts a lessee from paying rent to the landlord during the time
of such seizure. Itarrison v. Myer, 685.
2. Under the Landlord and Tenant Act of Illinois, a landlord has no lien
upon the personal property o" his tenant prior to an actual levy of distress.
Morgyv v. Campbell, 253.
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3. If proceedings of bankruptcy are begun by other persons against his
tenant before such warrant of distress be actually levied, the subsequent
assignment in bankruptcy will vest the personal property of the tenant in the
assignee, to the exclusion of the landlord's right to levy on it. M3organ v.
Campbell, 253.
4. A covenant by a lessor for quiet enjoyment is a covenant that the lessee
shall not be riqhf,lly disturhed in his possession and enjoyment during the
term, not that he shall not be disturbed at all. Underwood v. Birchard, 58.
5. In an action on a lease it is a good defcnce where the lessor was to
remain on the land with the lessee, that the lessee was " infected with a loath-
some, contagious and infectious disease." Doiqlas v. MlfcFadin, 310.
6. N. leased to G. certain property to be used as a distillery. As a pre-
liminary to its use it was necessary for the lessee to file with the United States
collector the written consent of the lessor as the owner in fee of the property,
in accordance with sect. 3262 of title xxxv of the Revised Statutes. The
lessor having refused to give such written consent, it was held, 1st. That the
lessee was discharged from all obligation to pay the rent-the default of the
lessor amounting to " constructive eviction." 2d. That theoiligation of the
lessor to give his -consent was to be implied as a necessary incident to the
lease. Grabenhorst v. Nicodemus, 381.
7. A claim for rent is not assignable as between mere joint occupiers.
Carver v. Palmer, 382.
8. A purchaser of grain from a tenant, with knowledge of the landlord's
lien on ir fur rent, will be liable to the landlord for the rent due, to the extent
of the value of the grain purchased by him. Prettyman v. Unland, 556.
LANGUAGE.
Where a statuie of the state requires-publication in a "newspaper," in the
absence of any provision to the contrary, a paper published in the English'
language is understood as intended. Cincinaati Y. Bickett, 501.
LEASE. See LANDLORD AND TENANT.
LEGAL TENDER NOTES. See EQUITY. 18.
United States treasury notes are a lgal tender upon contracts stipulating
for the payment of money generally. Longworth v. Mitchell, 688.
LIBEL. See EVIDENCE, 11.
Whether an alleged libel is a privileged communication, is a question forthe jury. Carpenter v. Bailey, 621.
LICENSE. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 15 ; HAWKERS AND PEDLERS.
LIGHT. See EASEMENT, 1-7.
LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF. See CONFLICT OF LAWS, 2, 3; VENDOR, 13.
1. An ordinance provided that the owners of lots on which assessments
were made should pay within twenty days from the date of the ordinance, or
be subject to the interest and penalty allowed thereon by law. eldl that an
action to enforce the lien of such assessment within six years after the expi-
ration of said twenty days, is not barred. Reynolds v. Green, 743.
2. A partial payment on a joint and several promissory note, by one of
several makers, will not prevent the running of the Statute of Limitations
as to the other maker. Rdance v. Hair, 189.
3. The mere payment of interest on a single bill barred by the statute, will
raise no such promise as'will support assumpsit for the amount due on the
single bill. Nothing less than an express promise will be sufficient. Leonard
v. Hughlett, 59.
4. In assumpsit on an express promise, the single bill may be given in
evidence as inducement to the express promise. Id.
5. A married woman who executes a mortgage of her land with her hus-
band, is not saved by her coverture from the running of the Statute of Lim-
itations against her title in favor of the mortgagee. Hanbrd v. Fitch. 85.
6. Where the plaintiff was induced not to commence a suit to recover his
claim by the defendant's agreement to refer to arbitration, the defendants
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were estopped from setting up the Statute of Limitations. Davis v. Dyer,
499.
7. As to sect. 18 of Code of Kansas, see Young v. lzatenhall, 314.
LOCAL OPTION LAWS. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 14.
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.. See SET-OFF, I.
1. The true inquiry in an action for malicious prosecution is what the de-
fendant had reason to believe and did believe were the facts. Gallaway v.
Burr, 190.
2. The institution of a criminal prosecution for the recovery of a private
claim is strong, if not conclusive evidence of malice ; if this is the motive,
the advice of counsel is no protection. Id.
3. To recover special damages the declaration should set out with particu-
larity the causes which produced them. ,Stanfidd v. Phillips, 314.
4. Evidence of special damages can only be given where they have been
properly averred in the declaration. Id.
5. In such an action, punitive damages can be recovered. McIVilliams v.
.loban, 315.
6. The police annals of the city on which the plaintiff's name was entered
are not admissible evidence against the defendant, unless there was some law
requiring such a record to be kept, or unless the plaintiff was prepared to
show by proof that the defendant knew that the name of the plaintiff would
be so entered as the consequence of the charge of theft brought against him.
Garret v. ||rayson, 382.
7. Where the court has rejected a prayer defining malice because it was
incorrect, it is not bound ex mero nota to give any definition of it. Id.
8. Probable cause does not depend on the actual state of the case in point
of fact, but upon the honest and reasonable belief of the party commencing
the prosecution. Harpham v. Whitney, 445.
9. Malice does not mean spite or hatred, but malus aninus, as denoting that
the party is actuated by improper and indirect motives. Id.
10. It is error, in an action for malicious prosecution, to permit witnesses
to rehearse the testimony given before the magistrate by witnesses other than
the defendants. John v. Bridgman, 556.
11. A witness, however, who was present can prove that no evidence in
support of the criminal charge was given by the defendant. Id.
MALPRACTICE. See ACTION, 2.
MANDAMUS. See MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 18.
MARITIME LIEN. See ADMIRALTY, III.
MARITIME USAGE. See ADMIRALTY, 12.
MARRIAGE. See HUSBAND AND WIFE, I.
MASTER AND SERVANT. See COUNTY.
i. A malicious assault by an employee of a railroad company, authorized
or approved by them, constitutes a case for exemplary damages. llinckley '.
The C., I. 4. St. P. Railway Co., 249.
2. While it is true that a common employer is not responsible to a servant
for an injury caused by the negligence of his fellow-servant engaged in the
same line of employment, yet it is the duty of a railway company as employer
to provide safe structures, &c., and*to adopt such regulations as will insure
safety. C. . N. IV Railway Co. v. Taylor, 253.
3. An employee on a railroad train continuing for eight months with the
same equipment estops his representatives in an action for damages after his
death from alleging the equipment to he defective. B, 6 0. Railroad Co. v-.
State, 60.
4. It is the duty of every employer to exercise reasonable car in providing
his laborers with safe machinery, suitable tools and appliances, adapted to tile
uses for which they are designed. Mullan v. &eamship Cu., 315.
5. Where a master places tbhe entire charge of his business, or a dtstinct
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branch of it, in tile hands of an agent, exercising no discretion and no over-
sight, the neglect by the agent of ordinary care in supplying and maintaining
suitable instrumentalities, is a breach of duty for which the master is liable.
Mullan v. Stcaaship Co., 315.
6. The risk which a laborer assumes of injury from the neglect of his fel-
low, is when they are co-operating in the same business, so that lie knows that
the employment is one of the incidents of their common service. Id.
7. Where a servant of a mining company was killed by tile falling of a
rock from the roof of a common gangway, notice to tile superintendent of the
dangerous situation of the roof was notice to the company ; and if this was
long enough before the accident to have given time to repair, the same was
sufficient to fix negligence upon tile company. Quincy Coal Co. v. Hood, 445.
8 Where a brakeman of a railway company is injured in consequence of
the giving way of a defective ladder, the company will not be liable, unless
it had notice of the defect, either actual or constructive. Toledo Railway Co.
v. Ingraham, 557.
MERGER. See CORPORATION, 18.
MILL-DAM.
As to Mill Act of 1868 of New Hampshire, see Town v. Faulkner, 685.
MISNOMER. See JUDGMENT, 4.
A party served with process under a wrong name can only take advantage
of it by plea in abatement, and this is so, though lie be an infant. Pond v.
Ennis, 315.
MORTGAGE. See BANKRUPTCY, 1, 6 ; HUSnAND AND WIFE, 24, 25 ; IN-
FANT, 1,2 ; JOINT TENANTS; LIMITATIONS, 5 ; NATIONAL BANK, I ; PAR-
TITION; RECORDING ACTS; USURY, I.
I. The generality of its language forms no objection to the validity of a
mortgage. A mortgage bf "the road and property" of a railroad company
is sufficient. Wilson v. Boyce, 743.
2. A railroad company can mortgage its lands not used for its track or ap-
purtenances. Id.
3. An unrestricted reference by rule of court of a suit pending upon a
mortgage gives authority to the referee, if he finds the plaintiff entitled to
recover, to determine the amount of the conditional judgment. Pales v.
Hamenway, 150.
4. Where the mortgage is conditioned to be void upon the filfilment by the
mortgagors of their obligation to the mortgagee for a life maintenance and
other things, the referee should make up the conditional judgment in such
sum as a present equivalent for full performance, including prospective as
well as past damages. Id.
5. A mortgagee of chattels who has expressly fixed a certain time and
place for the payment of the mortgage, makes himself a wrongdoer by seiz-
ing the chattel§ on the day before the day he has fixed for payment. Baxter
v. Spencer, 377.
6 Where a mortgage was given to a guardian to secure a debt due his
wards, and subsequently a new guardian was appointed in his place, who, in
ignorance of the 'existence of subsequent encumbrances upon the property,
agrqed that the time of payment of the mortgage-debt should be extended,
and took a new mortgage on the same property to secure its payment, but
without releasing the first~mortgage, it was held, that the debt secured by the
two mortgages was the same and should have the benefit of the lien of the
first mortgage. Drury v. Briscoe, 393.
MORTMAIN See TRUST, 4.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION. See ATTORNEY, 1; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,
23; CORPOttTioN, 6 ; COUNTY; DAMAGES, 1 ; INTOXICATING LIQUORS,
I ; WATERS AND WATERCOURSES, 3
I. Is liable for injury arising from defective highway, although a railroad
company using the street is bound by its charter to keep it in repair The
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duty is a public duty and the obligation of it cannot be discharged by con-
tracting with another for its performance. But the primary duty on the rail-
road company may be considered by the jury in determining the negligence
of the city. Watson v. Tripp, 282.
2. A tax-payer is not a competent juror in actions against a municipality.
Id.
3. The corporate authorities of a city hold the public streets in trust for the
use of the public. Where the municipality possesses the fee in such streets,
although in trust for public uses, it may maintain ejectment against any one
who wrongfully intrudes upon or occupies or detains the property. Where
the adjoining proprietor retains the fee, the right to the possession, use and
control of the street by the municipality is regarded as a legal and not a mere
equitable right. Chicago v. lVright, 316.
4. Equity has no power to enjoin the exercise of the police powers given
by law to the officers of a municipal corporation, so as to prevent such officers
from preserving the public peace, and from keeping. a public street open to
public use. .d.
5. A grant in a legislative charter of a railroad of a right to fix its ter-
minus at a point within the limits of a municipal corporation, to be approved
by the council, and the subsequent approval of the point of terminus by the
council, will not be taken to constitute an irrevocable contract, or to deprive
the corporation of its proper anl legal control over the use of its streets, un-
less such is the effect of an express grant or a necessary implication from
the charter. F. 6- P. Railroad Co. v. City qf Richmond, 170.
6. It is within the ordinary and implied powers of a municipal corporation
to regulste the kind of vehicles and the speed at which they may be used in
traversing its streets. Id.
7. Courts of chancery have no jurisdiction to restrain the threatened viola-
tion of a municipal ordinance unless the act amounts to a nuisance. Village
of St. .Toms v. MfrFarlan, 383.
8. The erection of a wooden building within municipal fire-limits is not
of itself a nuisance, nor does the fact that it is prohibited by an ordinance
make it so. Id.
9. A city, having power to construct public sewers, and to receive pay from
adjoining owners for liberty to enter their private drains into such sewers,
is responsible for negligently suffering them to occasion a nuisance, if the
nuisance does not result from the original plan of construction, and could be
avoided by keeping them in proper condition. Rowe v. Portsmouth, 713.
10. In maintaining such public sewer, a city is bound to use that degree
of care and prudence which a discreet and cautious individual would use if
the whole loss or risk was to be his alone. Id.
11. A city will not be liable for injuries caused to individuals, by an ob-
struction in such public sewer not placed there by its own officials or by au-
thority of the city government, until after actual. notice of such obstruction,
or until, by reason of the lapse of time, actual notice may be presumed. Id.
12. An assessment for street improvements, when the work is only par-
tially completed, is premature and unauthorized. Cincinnati v. S. G. Aveiue
Co., 686.
13. The division of a municipal corporation into others or its annexation
to another does not affect its rights and liabilities. Id.
14. Municipal corporations are created by the legislature from which they
derive all their powers, except where the constitution .of the state otherwise
provides. County Commissioners v. County Commissioners, 686.
15. Municipal corporations may act through their officers, but the people
are the source of all authority, ad it is to this authority they must come at
last, whether immediately or by a circuitous process. Barnes v. District of
Columbia, 686.
16. A provision in a city charter gave the power "1 to license, thx and reg-
ulate and control wagons and other vehicles conveying loads in the city; to
prescribe the width and tire of the same, the weight of loads to be carried
and the rates of carriages." illeld, not to apply to the case of wagons used
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by the defendant in the regular course of his business as a merchant, but only
extends to wagons of common carriers for hire. Joyce v. East St. Louis,
557.
17. Where specific power is given by the legislature authorizing a board
of education to issue negotiable bonds for school purposes, the regularity of
the proceedings cannot be inquired into against a boan fide holder. State v.
Board of Education, 557.
18. Mandamus is the proper remedy to compel the board to appropriate
moneys for that purpose. Id.
19. If the people of a county vote a subscription in aid of a railway com-
pany to be paid in bonds of the county upon certain conditions precedent, the
county authorities cannot delegate power to others to determine when the
conditions are performed, but must determine ttat fact themselves. Super-
visors v. Brush, 557.
MURDER. See CRIMINAL LAw, II.
NAME. See EVIDENCE, 2; JUDGMENT, 4; MISNOMER.
NATIONAL BANK. See CORPORATION, 26.
1. A national bank has no power to take a mortgage as security for the
loan of money, and if it does so, the mortgage is void and proceedings upon
it will be enjoined. JMatthews v. Skinker, 488.
2. Corporations having only the powers expressly given by their charters
or the law under which they are incorporated, or such as are necessarily im-
plied, must fallow strictly the mode of action prescribed by the law. A.
3. The National Bank Act not only fails to authorize, but expressly pro-
hibits the banks from dealing in real estate securities, except in certain spe-
cified cases to secure debts previously due. Id.
4. A person paying more than the legal rate of interest to a national bank
cannot have it applied as a payment of so much of the principal, in an action
brought two years afterwards. iligley v. First National Bank, 5ul.
5. In such case the rights of the parties are not affected by the state usury
laws. Id.
6. The New Hampshire statute, subjecting the surplus capital of banking
institutions to taxation, is applicable to national banks. First National Bank
v. Peterborough, 501.
7. Such taxation of the surplus capital of such banks, is not prohibited by
Congress, and is not an encroachment upon the constitutional powers vested
in the Federal government. Id.
8. The states can exercise no control over the national banks nor in any
wise affect their operation except in so far as Congress may see proper to per-
mit. National Bank v. Dearing, 621.
9. The provision of the Act of February 10th 1868, that taxation on na-
tional bank stock shall not be at a greater rate than is assessed upon other
moneyed capital in the states, relates only to the rate, and does not prohibit
the states. from exempting any subjects from taxation. Gorgas's Appeal, 622.
10. The stock of national banks is liable to a school tax in addition to the
state tax. Carlisle School District v. Hepburn, 622.
11. In the honest exercise of the power to compromise a doubtful debt,
stocks may be accepted in payment and satisfaction. National Bank V. Nat.
Exchange Bank, 743.
NEGLIGENCE. See ADMIRALTY, HI.; COMON CARRIER; MASTER AND SER-
VANT ; MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 1, 9-11.
1. Damages for death of plaintiff's husband should include all pecuniary
damages either already suffered or prospective. B. 6- 0. Railroad Co. v.
State, 60.
2. Next of kin may maintain action for death caused by negligence.
Grotenkemper v. Harris, 125.
3. In such cases, the reasonable expectation of what the next of kin might
have received from the deceased, had he lived, is the proper measure of dam-
ages. Id.
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4. In an action for injuries to the person of plaintiffIs intestate, causing
his death, although the recovery must be confined to damages of a strictly
pecuniary kind, yet the jury are not held to any fixed and precise rules in es-
timating tile amount of damages (within the statutory limit on that subject);
but may compensate all pecuniary injuries, from whatever source they may
proceed. Ewen v. C. 4- N. 1E Railway Co., 254.
5. Where the damages in such an action go to the parents of the deceased,
evidence of their health and estate, and of other facts bearing on the probabili-
ties of their needing the scrvices of the deceased, or of their suffering any
actual pecuniary loss from his death, may be submitted to the jury. d.
6. In such ait action, if it were clear from the undisputed facts, that the"
boy himself, considering his age and intelligence, did not exercise proper care
in crossing the track, or that, in view of his tender years, his mother was
guilty of contributory negligence in permitting him to go alone, the trial
court might determine, as a proposition of law, that there could be no reco-
very. Id.
7. But where the circumstances leave the inference of negligence in doubt,
and the court is unable to say that upon the most favorable construction for
the plaintiff which can be given to his evidence, there is nothing to submit
to the jury, a nonsuit is improper. Id.
8. Negligence is the absence of care, according to circumstances. Ph ila-
delphia, W|ilmington 4- Baltimore Railroad Co. v. Stingcr, 383.
9. The failure of an engineer approaching a highway, if danger is to be
apprehended, to give warning, is negligence per ce, to be determined by the
court. Id.
10. One driving a vicious horse along a public road, running side by side
with a railroad, does so at his peril. Id.
11. Negligence in the plaintiff which may have contributed to the injury
will not prevent a recovery, when it is slight as compared with the negligence
of the defendant. llinois Central Railroad Co. v. Benton, 316.
12. Negligence to operate as an estoppel must be the proximate cause of
the loss. Brown v. Howard Fire Ins. Co., 446.
13. C. bailed to B. a horse, for hire, to convey him from D. to S. B.,
upon arriving at S., put up the horse in a proper place, and the next morn-
ing properly watered, fed, and cared for her, and left her, intending to re-
turn, and in fact returning, within a suitable time to care for her, but having
reason to apprehend that A., sixteen years of age, would attempt to water
the horse during his absence. A. turned the horse loose to water her, and
the horse in consequence thereof became lamed. H-id, by the court sitting
ftr trial without a jury, that these facts showed no evidence of lack of ordi-
nary care and prudence on the part of B., and that he was not liable to C.
for the damages. Chase v. Boody,, 125.
14. The defendant was driving through a city street in the evening, on the
right hand side of the street, at a moderate speed, and in passing a team
standing on the same side of the road was compelled to turn into the middle
of the street, and in so doing necessarily occupied about two and a lialf feet
of the left hand side of the street. In thus passingaround the standing team
he came into collision with the plaintiff's vehicle which was coming towards.
him. There was ample room for both teams, but neither driver discoveredl
the other till the moment of collision, and both the plaintiff and defendant
were using ordinary care. Held, that the defendant was not liable for the
damage. Strouse v. Wldttlesey,, 33.
15 In an action against a railroad company for burning a house through
an alleged defective engine, held, that the condition of that engine and its
management were all that was to be considered Erie Railway Co. v. Decker,
445.
16 If that engine was properly constructed, the company would not be
liable, although the burning was occasioned by fire accidentally issuing from
it. Id.
17. Evidence to prove defects in other engines of the company was irrele-
vant. Id. I
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18. Where fire is communicated from an engine to adjoining lands and
from these to others the owner of the latter may sue and the negligence is not
too remote. Railroad Co. v. Bales, 622.
NEW TRIAL. See ERuoRs AND APPEALS, 4, 8.
NON-RESIDENT. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 11-13.
NONSUIT. See ERRORS AND APPEALS, 2.
NUISANCE. See MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 7, 8.
OFFICER. See COURTS, 11; TRESPASS, 3.
1. A promise to pay a public officer an extra sum beyond that fixed by
law, is not binding, though he renders services greater than could legally
have been required of him. Decatur v. 4rmnillion, 558.
2. If an officer advertises property taken in execution at one place, for sale
at another place, and sells it accordingly, he thereby becomes a trespasser ab
initio. Evarts v. Burgess, 744.
ORDINANCE. See INTOXICATING LiQuoRs; RAILROAD, 6; STATUTE, 9, 10.
PARENT AND CHILI).
1. The father is priradfacie entitled to the custody of his children, and
where he is of good character and able and willing to maintain them, his
right is paramount to that of all other persons, except in the single case of an
infant of such tender years as to necessarily require for its own good the care
of its mother. State cx rel. Lynch v. Bratton, 359.
2. But the father's right is not absolute or unqualified. He may relinquish
or forfeit it by contract, by his bad conduct or by his misfortune in being
unable to give it proper care and support. Id.
3. Where a father has, through his fault or his misfortune, lost or forfeited
his right, and subsequently, by reformation or otherwise, reinstates himself
in a position to properly care for and maintain his child, his right does not
necessarily revive, but a court upon habeas corpus will exercise a sound dis-
cretion in view of all the circumstances with reference to the welfare of the
child itself. .d.
4. A court will never order a child into the custody of an improper person,
but where the child has reached the age of discretion the court will in mahy
cases allow it to make its own choice, rven though it choose a person whom
the court would not voluntarily appoint. Id.
5. There is no fixed age at which the period of discretion is considered to
begin. It depends on the capacity of the child to reason sensibly, though as
a child, in regard to its condition, its feelings, and its future welfare. Id.
6. Courts hare no jurisdiction over the religious discipline and instruction
of children. Such matters are proper to be taken into consideration, among
other circumstances, in determining the custody of children where it is in
dispute, but a difference in regard to religious views does not of itself afford
any ground for interference by the court on petition of a father who has lost
or forfeited his right of custody, with the person who has acquired such right.
Id.
PARTITION.
1. A mortgagee of an interest in an undivided estate is not entitled to be
made a party to a proceeding in partition. Long's Appeal, 60.
2. When partition.is made, the security of the mortgage attaches to the
estate held in severalty. Id.
3 The mortgagee may object to fraud or unfairness affecting his interest,
but if the partition be fairly made he cannot gainsay it. Id.
PARTNERSHIP, See BANKRUPTCY, 15; BILLS AND NOTES, 18, 23, FonEiGir
JUDGMENT ; FRAUDs, STATUTE OF, 1.
1. The assignee in bankruptcy of the estate of an individual partner of a
debtor copartnership, cannot maintain a suit to recover back money pre-
viously paid to a creditor of the copartnership, upon the ground that the
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money was paid to such creditor in fraud.of the other creditors of the firm,
and in fraud of the provisions of the Bankrupt Act. The suit should be by
the assignee of the partnership. Amsinck v. Bean, 253.
2. The mere fact that one partner allows the other to manage the partner-
ship assets apparently as if they were his own, does not of itself dissolve the
partnership. Id.
3. In an action on a note, made by defendants in their firm name and
for a partnership debt, they cannot offset an account against plaintiff in favor
of another firm, now owned by one of the defendants. Wilson v. Runkel, 190.
4. Where a partnership and the several members of the firm are insolvent,
ind there are no partnership funds for distribution among its creditors, the
creditors of the firm are entitled to share equally with the creditors of each
partner, in the distribution of his individual assets, the amount so distributed
to the creditors of the firm, however, not to exceed the amount of their claims.
Brock v. Bateman, 214.
5. The subject of distribution of individual and firm assets among creditors.
discussed. Id., note, 216.
6. The separate property of each partner is alike liable to execution with
the property of the partnership, and equity will not ordinarily interfere.
Lewis v. United States, 678.
7. Partners are liable in solido for the torts of one, if the tort is committed
by him as a partner, and in the course of the partnership business. Loomis
v. Barker, 316.
8. When a share in the profits merely constitutes a part of the compensa-
tion received, it does not create a partnership. Burton v. Goodspeed, 316.
9. In an action for an account, it is not error for the court to submit to
one jury the question of the terms and duration of the partnership, then to
refer to a referee to state the account between the partners, and finally to
submit to a second jury the claims for damages. Carlin v. Donegan, 317.
10. The obligation of one partner to another is the exercise of good faith
and of ordinary care and pradence. d.
11. The members of an insolvent firm are not entitled to the statutory ex-
emptions out of the partnership property after it has been seized in execution
by partnership creditors, notwithstanding all the members join in demanding
the exemptions. Gaylord v. ninfnf, 477.
12. If notes are given bon& fide by a liquidating partner and the proceeds
applied to payment of firm debts, the other partners are liable. Loyd v.
Thoime% 624.
PARTY-WALL. See EASEMENT, 9, 10.
PASSENGER. See RAILROAD.
PATENT. See BiLLS AND NOTES, 1.
PAYMENT. See APPLICATION OF PAYMENTS ; CONFEDERATE STATES, 5.
I. A payment by a debtor to an administrator duly appointed is valid, and
a bar to a second action, although the supposed intestate is alive at the time
and the letters of administration are subsequently revoked for this reason.
Roderigas v. East River Saving institution, 205.
2. Although surrogate courts are of limited and special jurisdiction, which
depends upon the existence of certain facts, yet their decision upon the exist-
ence of such facts and their consequent jurisdiction is conclusive until regu-
larly reversed or vacated, and will protect all innocent parties acting on the
faith of it. Id.
3. Where a party accepts a deed in payment of a debt, and receipts the
same, in ignorance of the fact that the deed is a nullity, there being no such
property in existence as it assumes to convey, this will be no payment, and
he will not be concluded by his receipt. Anderson v. Armsead, 254.
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PLEADING. See CONTRACT, I ; EQUITY, 8; IIUSDAND AND WIFE, 11.
The replication de injaria is only allowed where the plea is in excuse, and
not in denial of the cause of action. BRucknan v. Railroad Co., 126.
POWERS.
As a general rule a power to sell and convey does not confer a power to
mortgage. It depends on the peculiar circumstances of the trust and the in-
tention of the parties. Tyson v. Latrobe, 446.
PRACTICE. See ERRORS AND APPEALS, I.
PROBATE COURTS. See PAYMENT, 2.
PROSECUTING OFFICER. See ATTORNEY, 8.
PUBLIC SCHOOLS. See INFANT, 3, 4.
1. It is the right of the directors of the public schools to prescribe the hours
of attendance of the pupils, and to make a proper system of punishments for
absence, &c. Ferriter v. Tgler, 570.
2. This rule applies to the attendance of the children on public or private
religious worship on week-days during the prescribed hours for school. Id.
PUBLIC USE. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 30-32.
Where a long acquiescence in the use of a plat of a village as a public park
was shown, it was held, to be a dedication at common law to the public use.
Village of Princeville v. Auten, 558.
PURCHASE. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 36.
QUO WARRANTO.
Where a person holds the office of prudential committee of a school district,
the writ will be denied when it appears that the petitionee was elected without
objection, upon the mistaken understanding of the voters that there had been
no election upon a prior balloting, although it turns out that in fact another
person was elected, who, at the same meeting, being ignorant of his election,
disqualified himself from holding the office by accepting another incompatible
therewith, and that all the voters acquiesced therein. Cate v. Farber, 686.
RAILROAD. See COMmON CARRIER, 6; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 32; Cot-
PORATION, 2, 5, 6; FENCE ; MASTER AND SERVANT; MORTGAGE, I;
NEGLIGENCE, 6, 9, 10, 15-18.
1. If a passenger is in the exercise of that degree of care which may rea-
sonably be expected from a person in his situation, and injury occur to him,
this is prima facie evidence of the carrier's liability. Railroad Co. v. Pollard,
190.
2. Whether a passenger in a rail-car by standing up in it, at the close of
the journey, but before its actual stoppage, is guilty of negligence, is a ques-
tion for the jury. Id.
3. Where the plaintiff is driving on a horse railway track when a car is
approaching from the opposite direction, it is his duty to turn off the track to
avoid a collision, and if he does not do so, he cannot recover against the rail-
way company, even if the latter was also in fault. Chicago IV. D. Railway
Co. v. Bert, 253.
4. Negligence on the part of a railroad company in permitting fire to
escape from its engines may be shown wholly by circumstantial evidence.
Railroad Co. v. Bales, 622.
5. Whether the speed of steam car in a city is safe and prudent is for the
jury. Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Lewis, 623.
6. The speed of trains through towns may be regulated by ordinance. rd.
7. A palace or sleeping-car is not an inn, nor is the company owning it
subject to the responsibilities as to traveller's baggage of an innkeeper at
common law. Pullhan Palace Car Co. v. Smith, 95.
8. A traveller, who was being transported by a railroad company, to whom
he had paid a fare, took a berth in a sleeping-car attached to the train, but
belonging to a different company, for which he paid an extra sum to the sleep-
ing-car company. While asleep lie was robbed of a large sum of money lie
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carried in his pocket. Held, that the steeping-car company was not liable,
either as an innkeeper or as a common carrier. Pullman Palace Car Co. v.
sinith, 95.
9. Conductors have a right to eject passengers from cars for non-payment
of fare. Jerome v. Smith3, 687.
REBELLION. See CAPTURED IwD ABANDONED PROPERTY CONFEDERATE
STATES ; CONFISCATION.
RECEIPT. See INSURANCE, 1, 2; PAYMENT, 3.
RECORD. See ERRORS AND APPEALS, 5-7.
RECORDING ACTS. See BANKRUPTCY, 17.
Under the statutes of Pennsylvania, iecording the assignment of a mort-
gage is notice to a subsequent assignee. Pepper's Appeal, 125.
RELIGION. See CHuncir, 4; PARENT AND CHILD, 6; PUBLIC SCHOOLS, 2.
REMOVAL OF CAUSES.
1. Where the papers in a case removed from a state court have been acci,
dentally destroyed and the parties by writing filed admit that the action was
removed, &c., the United States court will presume that the citizenship of the
parties was such as to give itjurisdiction. Railway Co. v. Ramsay, 191.
2. When in a case which is properly removed from a state court into the
Circuit Court of the United States, a complainant getting a decree in the state
court and sending a transcript of it into another state, sues the defendant on it
there, the Circuit Court into which the case is removed may enjoin the com-
plauinant from proceedings in any such or other distant court until it hears
the case. French v. Iuly, 192.
3. Where an application of the plaintiff is pending in a district court of the
state, to remove the action into the United States Circuit Court, and the hear-
ing of the application is set by the court for a particular day in the future, it
is error for the court to allow the defendant, before that day arrives, and in
the absence of the plaintiff and his attorneys, and without any notice to them,
to take judgment against the plaintiff, although, upon the pleadings, the de-
fendant is entitled to just such a judgment as he obtained. But where said
application is defective, and ought to be overruled, and is eventually over-
ruled, and where the plaintiff, who is in default for want of a reply, after!
wards moves the court to vacate said judgment, but does not offer to file a
reply, and makes no such showing as would entitle him to file d reply, and
where the judgment is correct upon the pleadings in the absence of a reply,
and the court overrules the motion to vacate the judgment : Held, that the
errrr of the court in rendering the judgment is now immaterial, and therefore
the judgment will not be disturbed. Cooper v. Condon et al., 317.
4. Under the Act of Congress of M ay 2d 1867,'the plaintiff, to remove an
action from a district court of the state to the United States Circuit Court,
must make the affidavit himself. 7d.
5. Under the Act of March 3d 1875, a cause will not be removed unless the
petition for such removal be filed in the state court before or at the term at
which said cause could first be tried, and before the first trial thereof. Such
petition will not, therefore, be entertained, when filed in the state court after
a verdict in the cause has been rendered, notwithstanding the verdict may
have been set aside for error and a new trial ordered. Chandler v. Coe, 540.
REPLEVIN. See EVIDENCE, 12.
1. A husband gave a chattel mortgage upon a span of horses in use on his
wife's farm, and absconded. The mortgagee, without making any demand
for them, replevied them for breach of the condition of the mortgage. Hdd.
that the mere presence of the horses on the farm did not make the wife a
wrongdoer, and that the mortgagee was bound to present his claim to her,
before he could lawfully subject her to the costs of a suit. Campbell v. Quack-
enbush, 384. \
2. Liability of obligors in replevin bond. Sweeny v. Lomme, 126.
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RIPARIAN OWNER. See ALLUTION ; WATERS AND WATERCOURSES.
SALE. See VENDOR AND PURCIHASER; WARRANTY.
1. What was held merely an executory contract, notwithstanding the use
of words implying a completed sale. Elqec Cotton Cases, 117.
2. Damages for refusal to accept goods made to order, discussed. Note to
Shawhan v. Van Nest, 160.
s. In the case of warehouse receipts there is an exception to the rule that
to affect subsequent purchasers without notice, and cr6ditors, there must be
an actual delivery of personal property. Broadwell v. Howard, 558.
4. Delivery is the most significant fact td prove transfer of title, but it is
not conclusive; parties may agree that title shall not pass until the measure-
ment be made to determine the amount of the price to be paid. Wilkinson v.
Holida.y, 624.
5. Delivery is a question for the jury. Id.
SALVAGE. See ADMIRALTY, 15.
SCHOOL. See PUBLIC SCHOOL.
SET-OFF. See INTOXICATING LIQUORS, 5; PARTNERSHIP, 3.
1. The claim -in a suit for malicious prosecution is not the subject of offset
in a suit subsequently brought upon a contract, in violation of which the
former suit was brought. Sampson v. Warner, 687.
2. In Kansas any cause of action arising from contract, whether it be for
liquidated or unliquidated damages, may constitute a set-off. Stevens v. Able,
318.
3. The debts which may be set-off against each other at law or in equity,
must be in the same right. Scammon v. Kimball, 559.
1. In the ordinary course of business, funds deposited with a banker be-
come his property and constitute an ordinary debt payable on demand in
instalments at the depositor's option, and the subject of set-off, but semble, if
they were deposited with him as treasurer of a corporation the funds would
be held upon a trust and not subject to set-off. Id.
5. Where an insurance company has funds on deposit with a banker and
becomes insolvent, he may set-off his losses on property insured by the com-
pany. Id.
SHERIFF.
The sheriff's return of service on original process does not, in Illinois,
import absolute verity, but is only prim& facie evidence. Sibert v. Thorp, 502.
SHERIFF'S SALE. See TRUST, 6; VENDOR AND PURCHASER, 1.
1. In an action against a purchaser at sheriff's sale refusing to comply with
the conditions, for a difference of bid at a second sale, the suit must be in the
name of the sheriff. Freeman v. Husband, 127.
2. Where there has been a change of conditions at the second sale the pur-
chaser is not liable for such difference. Id.
3. Where land was represented by the sheriff as unencumbered, when in
fact it is, and the plaintiff in the execution buys it in, this will afford no
ground for setting aside the sale and satisfaction, as the sheriff is not the agent
of the defendant. Vanscoyoc v. Kimler, 559.
4. Where a judicial sale has been made on void process, the court may,
while the purchase-money remains in. the hands of the sheriff, on the appli-
cation of the purchaser, set aside the sale and order the purchase-money to
be refunded. Dowdell v. Goode, 189.
5. Any contract entered into at a judicial sale, on the part of the bidders,
to prevent competition at such sale, will vitiate it. 'lVilson v. Kellogg, 445.
SHIPPING. See AD3MIRALTY.
1. Where a vessel has sailed under a charter-party with cargo aboard, she
is entitled to net freight for the whole voyage, in accordance with the terms
of the charter, though destroyed by an insurgent cruiser, when but one day
out. Buck v. United States, 287.
2. Where destroyed while sailing in ballast, under charter, to take in cargo
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at her port of first destination, to be carried thence to a port of final destina-
tion, she is entitled to net freight on the cargo which she was thus to have
taken on board. Buck v. United States, 287.
3. Where destroyed while sailing under one charter to deliver, at a desig-
nated port, cargo on board, and to bring other cargo home, she is entitled to
net freight for the round trip. Id.
4. Where destroyed while sailing under two distinct and independent char-
ters, to carry under the first, cargo to an intermediate port, and under the*
second, to carry other cargo to a port more distant, she is entitled to net
freight under each charter, though destroyed before the fulfilment of the first,
if she has made it satisfactorily to appear by proper proof, or necessary legal
presumption, that she entered fairly at the same time on the commencement
and prosecution of both voyages. Id.
5. The provisions of the Act of Congress of June 23d 1874, that the court
of Alabama claims shall not allow any claim for unearned or prospective
freights or profits, do not change the foregoing principles of commercial law. Id.
6. Repairs at au intermediate port, if necessary, constitute a proper subject
of general average. iobson el al. v. Lord, 687.
7. So are wages of the officers and crew, whether the ship bore away for
repairs to a port of refuge outside of her regular course, or whether the neces-
sary repairs were executed in the port where the disaster occurred. Id.
SLANDER.
1. Where the plaintiff, a partner, said of the defendant, his co-partner,
"He is a swindler and thief, and stole $8000 from me :" Held, on demurrer,
1. That the words recited, unqualified by averments, are actionable per 8e,
as they charge a crime. 2. That if it appeared from the complaint that the
words were spoken and understood merely as charging that plaintiff had
made false entries in the account books of the firm, and in that manner alone
had stolen from the defendant, the words would not be actionable per se and
the complaint would be bad for lack of an averment of special damage.
Stern v. Katz, 255.
2. In the absence of any statute making fornication indictable, words im-
puting sexual intercourse to a woman are not actionable in themselves, unless
she is married, and a declaration which does not aver that she is married, fails
to set forth any cause of action. Pollard v. Lyon, 233.
3. The averment that thereby the plaintiff was "damaged and injured in
her name and fame" is not a sufficient averment of special damage. Id.
4. To support an action of" slande" the words must be: 1. Words which
impute the commission of some criminal offence involving moral turpitude,
for which the party, if the charge is true, may be indicted and ptlnished.
2. Words which impute that the party is infected with some contagious dis-
ease, where, if the charge is true, it would exclude the party from society.
3. Words which impute to the party unfitness to perform the duties of an
office or employment of profit, or the want of integrity in the discharge of'the
duties of such an office or employment. 4. Words which prejudice such party
in his or her profession or trade. 5. Words which, though not in themselves
actionable, occasion the party special damage. Id.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. See EQUITY, 10 ; VENDOR, 9.
STAMP.
1. The want of a stamp on a note is no evidence of want of consideration.
Long v. Spencer, 443.
2. The Internal Revenue Act merely made the want of a stamp a dis-
qualification of the instrument as evidence. rd.
STATUTE. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, 16, 40, 41.
1. In construing a statute, the punctuation is entitled to small considera-
tion. Morrill v. The State, 192.
2. Whenever a legislature has used a word in a statute in one sense, and
subsequently use the same word in legislation on the same subject-matter,
other things being equal, it will be understood as using it in the same sense.
State v. Woodford, 318.
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3. Though the statement of facts in a preamble to a statute is not evidence
as against a party whose rights are affected without his consent, yet where.
the legislature does an act within its powers, a statement of its reasons
in a preamble will not affect the validity of its act. Lathrop v. Staman,
346.
4. A statute repealing a charter at a certain date, provided that the com-
pany shall make up a deficiency in its assets before that date, then the charter
shall remain in force, and appointing a special tribunal to determine whether
the deficiency is made up or not, is not a delegation of legislative power and
is valid. A statute may be passed to take effect on the happening of a future
event. Id.
5. The meaning of a statute must be ascertained by a reasonable construc-
tion of its provisions, and not one founded on mere arbitrary conjecture.
Ceaross v. -The State, 447.
6. No man incurs a penalty unless the act which subjects him to it is clearly
within both the spirit and letter of the statute. Id.
7. Reference to legislative journals for interpretation of. Blake v. Na-
tional Bank, 502.
8. Where a legislative act contains two sets of provisions, one giving spe-
cific and precise directions to do a particular thing, and the other in general
terms prohibiting certain acts which would, in the general sense of the words
used, include the particular act before authorized, then the general clause
does not control or affect the specific enactment. State, Bartlet pros., v.'
Trenton, 127.
9. Where an ordinance is confused, yet if, by careful reading, aided by a
map, it is intelligible, it will not be avoided for uncertainty. Effect murt be
given, if possible, to all ordinances regularly passed, and within the powers
conferred by the charter. State, Boice pros., v. Plain.field, 127.
10. Where an ordinance is annulled for want of jurisdiction by competent
notice to the persons affected, the error is fundamental and cannot be reme-
died by subsequent legislation. Id.
STREAM. See WATERs AND WATERCOURSES.
STREET. See MUNIOIPAL CORPORATION, 1, 3-6, 12.
SUBROGATION.
Subrogation in equity is confined to the relation of principal and surety,
and guarantors, and to cases where a person, to protect his own junior lien,
is compelled to remove one which is superior, and to cases of insurers paying
losses. Bishop v. O'Conner, 255.
SUNDAY. See BILLS AND NOTES, 12.
SURETY. See EXECUTOR, 1 ; GUARANTY; TR VER, 1.
1. The plea of sureties upon a collector's bond that it is not their deed, is
well maintained by proof that subsequently to its delivery, and without their
knowledge or consent, but with the knowledge and consent of the selectmen
of the town having custody of the bond; the penal sum was changed by the
principal from twenty-five hundred to twenty-five thousand dollars. Dover v.
Robinson, 200.
2. Such an alteration, so made, avoids the bond as to the sureties. It can-
not be deemed a spoliation by a stranger. The inhabitants of the town can-
not maintain suit against the sureties upon a bond thus vitiated. Id.
3. The town itself ratifies such permission by inserting in their writ a count
upon the bond in its altered condition. They cannot take the chance of reap-
ing a benefit therefrom without incurring at the same time a risk of loss.
Id.
4. To enable a surety who pays a debt to recover the amount of the prin-
cipal, both principal and surety must at the same time be legally hound for
it. Ilollinsba v. Ritcheyl, 60.
5. As a rule of law, complete fairness is due from the creditors of a debtor
to one about to become surety ; but this rule will not excuse the person about
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(t become surety from reasonable diligince to inform himself as to the pru-
dence of the act he is about to do. Stedman v. Boone, 61.
SURROGATE COURT. See PAYMENT, 2.
TAXATION. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 29; EQUITY, 18; NATIONAL BANK,
6-10.
1. LIMITATIONS ON TAXING POWER ARISING OUT OF THE SITUS OF PRO-
PERTY, 65, 129. ,
2. LIMITATIONS IMPOSED BY THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES,
ON THE TAXING POWER OF THE STATES, 625, 689.
3. A claim of exemption from taxation whether state, county or municipal,
must be founded on clear intention of the legislature ; negative language is
Dot sufficient. Bailey v. .3faguire, 127.
4. Lands held by trustees for a church, do not constitute a part of the
"endowment or fund" of a religious society, and are not exempt from taxa-
tion. State V. Krolhnan, 128.
5. As to tax on corporations for internal revenue, see Blake v. National
Bank, 502.
TELEGRAPH. Sec EVIDENCE, 3.
TENANT IN COMMON. See VENDOR, 9.
TIME. See COVENANT, 2, 3; 1NSURANCE, 24; VENDOR AND PURCHASER, 10.
TITLE. See BAILMENT, 1 ; EXCHANGE.
1. The owner of a chattel cannot, apart from legal process, be divested
of his title to it, except through some unlawful or improvident act of his own.
The transfer of possession to another without more is not such act. Quinn
v. Daris, 319.
2. The transfer must be accompanied by something, indicating in the cus-
todian a right of property or power of alienation ; there must be proof of
language or conduct at least equivocal. d.
TORT. See MASTER AND SERVANT, I ; PARTNERSHIP, 7.
TOW-BOAT. See ADMIRALTY, 14, 17.
TRESPASS. See OFFICER, 2.
1. A justification under a statute for entry on land to build an aqueduct must
be strictly proved. Farnsivorlh v. Goodhue, 744.
2. In trespass for assault and battery, the declaration may be amended so
as to include an allegation of unlawful detention or imprisonment. Cahill v.
Terrio, 116.
3. An execution which recites a judgment only against B., and is issued
upon a judgment only against B., is no protection to an officer in levying
upon the property of A., although it commands him to seize the property of
A. Wilton Town Company v. Hui.mphrey, 319.
TRIAL.
1. When a cause is tried by the court, without a jury, by the consent of
parties, the court is substituted in the place of a jury, and its findings on
questions of facts cannot be reviewed by writ of error. Columbia Bridge Co.
v. Geisse, 128.
2. On the trial of a civil action wherein the claim or defence is based on
an alleged fraud, the issue may be determined in accordance with the prepon-
derance or weight of evidence, whether the facts constituting the alleged fraud
do, or do not, amount to an indictable offience. Jones V. Greaves, 544.
3. Courts do not possess the power to change by instructions the issues
which the pleadings present. iron Afountain Bank v. Armstrong, 733.
4. An instruction that the jury may disregard the testimony of a witness
who has sworn falsely, concerning any material fact in issue, should not be 4
given. They cannot reject his evidence unless they believe that he has know-
ingly testified to an untruth. Id., and see WITNESS, 6.1 \
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5. It is not competent, in order to show that a party to a note in suit has
authorized the insertion of a clause respecting interest, to show that he was a
party to other notes containing similar clauses. Iron Mountain Bank v. Arm-
strong, 733.
6. A witness cannot be questioned in regard to impertinent matter in order
to contradict him. Id.
TROVER. See BILL or LADING; EVIDENCE, 13.
1. The relation of suretyship is based on the consent of all the parties.
Kenyon v. Woodruff, 384.
2. A recovery for conversion terminates the right to reclaim the property
converted. Id.
3. Where parties are jointly guilty of conversion, and judgment has been
recovered against one of them therefor, the injured party, by proceeding to
enforce collection against him under that judgment, elects to look to him
alone and bars himself from having recourse to the rest. Id.
4. A deputy sheriff was deceived by certain persons into converting pro-
perty for their benefit. Judgment was recovered against him for the conver-
sion, and he, in turn, sueing them in tort for the damage caused him by their
fraud, recovered the amount of the judgment obtained against himself. This
was held a proper measure of damage. Id.
TRUST AND TRUSTEE. See CHURCr
1. B. deposited in a savings bank certain money in his own name as trustee
for R. and gave the bank-book to R., who was his step-daughter ; R. returned
the book to B., in whose control it remained until his death. In an equity
suit by R. against the administrator of B., claiming the deposit as trust funds
held by B. for R. : ield, that the trust was completely constituted, and the
fact that it was voluntary was no reason for refusing relief. Ray v. Simmons,
701.
2. Testator devised to his wife absolutely all his estate, real and personal.
The wife died two days after his death, intestate. Bill is filed by testator's
heirs and next of kin to set up aparol agreement between testator and his wife,
that, at the death of wife, the property was to be equally divided between the
two families. Held, unless fraud is alleged and proved, no such trust can be
set up byparol. Sprinkle v. Iayworth, 36.
3. The limitation over, being of what was left at death of wife, could not
be enforced, even if it had been expressly limited on the face of the will, as
such a limitation would be repugnant to the absolute devise and, void. Id.
4. Where an absolute estate is devised, but upon a secret trust assented to
by the devisee, either expressly or impliedly by knowledge and silence before
the death of the testator, a court of equity will fasten a trust on him on the
ground of fraud, and consequently the Statute of Mortmain will avoid the
devise if the trust is in favor of a charity. Schultz's Appeal, 460.
5. But if the devisee have no part in the devise, and no knowledge of it
until after the death of the testator, there is no ground upon which equity
can fasten such a trust on him, even though after it comes to his knowledge
he should express an intention of conforming to the wishes of the testator.
Id.
6. The simple avowal by a purchaser at sheriff's sale that the purchase was
for another, will not support the allegation of a trust. Carhart's Appeal,
311.
7. As between trustee and cestui que trust, or agent and principal, the
trustee or agent cannot take the benefit of a transaction entered into in vio-
lation of his duty. Cumberlnnd Cnal and Iron Co. v. Parrish, 447.
8. Transactions between a corporation and its directors are governed by
the rule applicable to transactions between principal and agent, &c. fd.
9. The burden of proof is upon a party holding a fiduciary relation to es-
tablish the perfect fairness of a transaction with the party with whom he holds
such relation. Id.
10. Where a trustee has sold the trust property to another. thnt salehnving
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been judicially confirmed nfter opposition by the cestuique trust, the fact that
thirteen years afterwards he bought the property from the person to whom he
once sold it does not, of necessity, vitiate his purchase. Stephen v. Beale et
ux., 256.
11. Where a trustee claims compensation for services, he must show that
he has discharged the trust ; and it the agreement to pay him out of the fund
is disputed, he must establish it by a preponderance of evidence. Jenkins v.
Doolittle, 256.
12. At common law, in the absence of a contract, a trustee is entitled to no
compensation for the management of the trust property ; he may however charge
for all reasonable expenses incurred in caring for it. Huggins v. Rider, 559.
13. Trustees have a right to he reimbursed all expenses reasonably incurred
in the execution of the trust ; and it is immaterial that there are no provisions
for such expenses in the instrument of trust. Rensselaer 4- Saratoga Railroad
Co. v. Miller, 61.
14. Such expenses are a lien upon the trust property. Id.
ULTRA VIRES. See Citustci, 5.
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD CO.
As to the relations of the United States with the Union Pacific Railroad
Company, see United States v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 619.
UNITED STATES COURTS. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 37, 39 ; CoURTS;
WAt, 1.
USAGE. See ADMIRALTY, 12; BnoxxE, 3; CONTRACT, 12, 20; HIGu-
WAY, 3.
Cannot control the plain meaning of language in a contract. .fercer
Mining Co. v. McKee, 61.
USURY. See BILLS AND NOTES, 14 ; INTEREST, 5 ; NATIONAL BANK, 4, 5.
1. Where one purchases land subject to a mortgage, which as part of the
consideration he agrees to pay, he cannot defend against the mortgage on the
ground of usury. Cramer v. Lepper ct al., 503.
2. Upon default of payment of interest, interest on interest will be com-
puted at six per cent. Id.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER.
1. A defaulting purchaser at an executor's sale is entitled upon a re-sale
to the surplus proceeds. Mealey v. Page, 62.
2. Where the intent of a contract for sale of land is clearly to make a sale
by the acre, and tile contract is injfiri, the rule is to compel payment of pur-
chase-money, according to the quantity. Coughenour's Ad'rs v. Sta/ty, 62.
3. In some cases equity will rejieve where the difference in quantity is so
great as to be evidence of gross mistake or fraud.. Id.
4. When a contract, whether executory or executed, is with reference to
an official survey, it will be construed to be a sale according to the quantity
stated in it, unless there be express provision for remeasurement, or fraud or
such palpable mistake as is evidence of it. Id.
5. Where the contract is executed by deed, or by bond or other security
taken for unpaid purchase-money, the rule is not to open such contract to
allow a deficiency or recover for an excess, even if the sale be by the acre. Id.
6. 'he rule that a sale by the acre calls for a survey to fix the quantity,
will yield always to tle intent of the parties to abide by the quantity stated
In the agreement or referred to in other writings. Id.
7. What is a material fact for tie jury. Tenbrooke v. Jdcke, 128.
8. When there is a mutual mistake as to an encumbrance on land sold
equity rescinds the contract and restores the parties to their former position.
Id.
9. Where a tenant in common contracts for the sale of the entire land,
with a purchaser who in good faith believes him to be sole owner, on a bill
filed by such purchaser fur a specific execution of the contract, equity will
decree a conveyance by the vendor of his interest in the land, and a compen-
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sation in noney for the value of the outstanding interest. Longworth v.
M[tchel!, 688.
10. Where a party makes an offer to sell on specified terms, giving the
proposed purchaser the option to accept the terms within a limited- period,
time is to be regarded as of the essence of the offer, and an acceptance of the
terms after the peridd limited will not be binding. Md.
11. A party who buys land and gives notes for the purchase-money, butgets
no deed, but only the vendor's bond to convey on payment of the notes, has
only an equitable title ant cannot convey more. Lewis v. Thakins, 503.
12. The discharge of such a purchaser in bankruptcy will relieve him from
payment of the notes, but will not give him any further title to the land. Id.
13. Statutes of Limitation do not run in such a case. If the notes are not
paid the vendor may file a bill for foreclosure. d.
14. Vendor should tender a deed, but if that would have been useless it is
excused. Id.
WAGES. See CORPORATION, 2.
WAR. See CONFEDERATE STATES; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 38; INSURANCE,
25-27.
1. The effect, under the general public law, of a state of sectiohal civil war
upon a contract of life insurance, does not present a federal question which
the Supreme Court of the United States can determine. -New, York Lfe Ins.
Co. v. Hlendren, 556.
2. An honorable discharge of a soldier from. service does not restore to him
pay and allowances forfeited for desertion. United States v. Landers, 560.
3. Under the term " allowances" bounty is included. Al.
4. As a general rule one of the immediate effects of a state of war is that
commercial intercourse between suljcts of the contending powers is inter-
dicted. In the United States, ]owever, licenses to carry on trade may be issued
by the authority of an Act of Congress, and in special cases by the authority
of the President. Matthews v. McStea, 560.
WAREHOUSE RECEIPT. See SALE, 3.
WARRANTY.
1. A covenant against encumbrances is broken by an existing mortgage
made by a prior owner, under which plaintiff is evicted, and a subsequent
reversal of the proceedings will not affect plaintiff's right of action. Smith
v. Dixon, 744.
2. The defendant sold plaintiff a horse, warranting it sound, the eyes being
then ure ; evidence of the condition of the eyes a year afterwards was admissi.
ble for the purpose of showing that the disease was not temporary, but per.
manent. Freryman v. Knecht, 318.
3. Evidence however should also have been received to show what was
their condition during the intermediate time. Id.
4. Where there is a warranty and no fraud or agreement to return, the
vendee cannot rescind the contract after it has been executed; his only remedy
is on the warranty. Id.
WATER AND WATERCOURSES. See ALLUVION; EQUITY, I.
1. The right of every riparian owner to the enjoyment of a stream of run-
ning water in its natural state, is incident to the ownership of the land itself,
and being a common rigt, every proprietor is bound so to use the common
right as not to interfere with an equally beneficial enjoyment of it by others.
Ma3 or of Baltimore v. Appold, 448.
2. A riparian owner who apprehends damages from the introduction of an
artificial supply of water into the stream may file a bill averring his informa-
tion and belief upon the facts, and will be entitled to an injunction without
waiting for actual damage. Id.
3. If a city, in fixing the grade of a street, or in afterwards changing it,
causes water to flow upon a lot that it did not naturally flow upon,- the city
will be held liable therefor. City of Bloominyton v. Brokaw, 560.
INDEX.
WAY. See EASEXENT, 14, 15.
WILL. See TnUST, 2-5.
I. Non-professional witnesses, who are not subscribing witnesses to a will,
may testify to their opinions in regard to the sanity of the testator, when
founded upon their knowledge and observation of the testator's appearance
and conduct. Hardy v. Merrill, 620.
2. The party who affirms that a will was duly and legally executed has the
burden of proof, and the accompanying duty of opening, and the right to close,
no matter in what form the issues for trial may be drawn. Id.
WITNESS. See TIAL, 6 ; WILL, 1.
I. If a child under the age of niue years is found, after examination by the
court, to possess a sufficient sense of the wickedness and danger of false
swearing, he may be sworn, and admitted to testify. Day v. Day, 620.
2. In courts of the United States parties to a civil suit (the suit not being
one by or against executors or guardians) may testify by deposition as well
as orally. Railroad Co. v. Pollard, 192.
3. What person a witness within the meaning of Revised Statutes U. S.,
15399. United States v. Bittinger, 49.
4. When a case is pending in contemplation of said statute. Id.
5. Where a firm through an agent enters into a contract, the person with
whom the contract is made, oln his suit against the firm for a breach of the
contract, is a competent witness, although the agent be dead. Spencer v.
Trafford, 319.
6. The rulefrss in uno,falsusin omnibus, should not be interposed between
the witness and the jury, commanding the jury to take all or to exe.ude all
of his testimony. Shdlenberger v. Nafus, 320; and see TaIAL, 4.
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